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The creation of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo was a unique moment in
international politics, a moment when events compelled the key players in international politics to
reveal what they thought about a crucial question ofinternational affais; what is a state? The way
the important indimvdual states, the United Nations, the North American Treaty Organization, the
European Union, and other international organizations went about creating a new government from
thin air provides important insight into both what ideas dominated international aw thinking at the
time and perhaps more importantly, how ideas impact decision-making at the international evel.
Tis Article argues that "disaggregated sovereignty," and the general corpus of"'Libeialism"
in international relations and international law, provided the dominant understanding of state
behavior in late twentieth centuiy legal scholarship. Moreover, the Article will argue that the
principles of this legal and international relations literature underlay the design of the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The administrative andlegal framework of UNMIK closely
resembles the idea ofa modern liberal state inherent in the disaggregated sovereignty literature.
As such, this Article attempts to use the creation of UAMIK instrumentally Through
analyzing its structure, it tries to understand what international decision-makers think about the
crucial question of what a "state"is (or rather, thought at the tie of the creation of LNMIK), the
ways in which the answer to tis question impacted the citizenry of Kosovo, and the implications
this has for contemporary international law theory This Article argues that in contrast with the
predictions of purely sociological analyses of the way ideas travel in world society the interal
structure of dsaggregated sovereignty theory was a crucial reason for its adoption as a model for
UNMIK
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It has become commonplace to say that ideas have real-world
consequences. Understanding which ideas have what consequences,
however, is a difficult endeavor. Determining which ideas dominated
international discourse on an important but theoretically complex topic
and how they impacted policy-making can be a virtually impossible task.
History, though, is sometimes kind to researchers: when events compel
the international community to make collective decisions, researchers
can analyze the results to see which ideas were most influential and what
role they played in the actual decision-making of people in positions of
power. The creation by the international community of a state-like
governing apparatus in Kosovo was one of these rare occasions. The way
the United Nations (U.N.), the North American Treaty Organization
(NATO), the European Union (EU), important individual states, and a
number of international organizations went about creating a new
government gives important insight into both which ideas dominated
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international law thinking at the time, and perhaps more importantly, how
ideas impact decision-making at the international level.
More specifically, this Article will argue that "disaggregated
sovereignty" and the general corpus of "Liberalism" in international
relations and international law provided the dominant understanding of
state behavior in late twentieth century legal scholarship and that the
principles of this legal and international relations literature underlay the
design of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The
administrative and legal framework of UNMIK closely resembles the
idea of a modern liberal state inherent in the disaggregated sovereignty
literature. Although this correlation does not prove that the literature
directly informed the people and organizations responsible for designing
UNMIK, it does provide evidence that the dominant ideas in world
society animated international policy-making. Moreover, the internal
structure of the disaggregated sovereignty idea created this possibility;
the claim that nonliberal states could be transformed into liberal ones
through links between substate institutions, like regulatory agencies and
courts, served as the crucial intellectual bridge for that idea to be used as
the model for UNMIK. The correlation between scholarship and
implementation creates a challenge for those scholars who seek to
explain the transfer of legal and political ideas solely by sociological
means (i.e., the pressures and lures created by other states and
international organizations and interactions of individuals and nonstate
actors with global culture). The structure of the ideas, and specifically
whether they are considered by their holders to be universally applicable,
turns out to be crucial for determining whether they will spread through
international institutions and make their way into state practice.
I. INTRODUCTION: USING UNMIK INSTRUMENTALLY
The withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's military in
May 1999 left Kosovo without a functioning government.' In response,
the United Nations assumed responsibility for the civil administration of
the territory.2 For many years, the United Nations ran various, limited
forms of "international territorial administration" through its peace-
keeping and humanitarian arms and had been engaging in various
governing projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1995. Kosovo, however,
1. Ralph Wilde, Comment, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of
IntemationalTernitorialAdmim'stration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 593 (2001).
2. See Judith Miller, Crisis in the Balkans: The Administrators: As Task Force Chief,
UN's No. 2 Official Is Put to Test, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1999, at A8.
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presented a far greater challenge.' The solution the United Nations
proposed did not resemble any previous U.N. mission, nor did it resemble
the historical examples of post-World War II Japan or Germany.4 The
mission in Kosovo represented something new: a governance structure,
rather than a unitary government, with various functions run by different
international organizations for an area rather than a state, as the future
sovereignty of the territory was-and is still-in doubt.5
A few analysts have examined the effect the choice of this
institutional form has had on Kosovo.6 However, virtually nothing has
been written about what the structure reveals about its creators: the
United Nations, the international community, and important states and
organizations like the United States and the European Union. As such,
this Article will attempt to use the creation of UNMIK instrumentally.
By analyzing UNMIK's structure, this Article will try to understand how
international decision-makers conceived of a "state" at the time of the
creation of UNMIK, the ways in which the answer to this question
impacted Kosovo's citizenry, and the implications this issue has for
contemporary international law theory.
A group of American constitutional law scholars has long relied on
the assumption that "legal argument and judicial explanation ...
unselfconsciously reflect underlying assumptions about actual and
potential social relations and about the institutional arrangement and
forms of political life fit for those relations as they are and are capable of
becoming."7 According to this premise, judges do not understand or care
about broad theoretical concerns. However, judicial decisions are still
rooted in theory. Because judges exist in a specific intellectual and
psychological milieu, their thinking about specific cases and
controversies reflects certain ideas and assumptions about society.9 The
3. Eric Schmitt, UN Drags Feet in Kosovo, Pentagon Leaders Declare, N.Y TmEs, July
21, 1999, at A10.
4. See id.
5. Laura Palmer, A Very Clear and Present Danger- Hate Speech, Media Reform, and
Post-Conflict Democratization in Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 179, 182 n. 12 (2001).
6. See, e.g., Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System.-
The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (2001); Palmer,
supra note 5.
7. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutonal
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 444 (1989); see also Richard Parker, Political
Vision in Constitutional Argument (unpublished manuscript), quoted in HENRY J. STEINER,
MORAL ARGUMENTAND SOCIAL VISION INTHE COURTS 205-06 (1987).
8. Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narradves and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1752, 1753
(1988).
9. See id.
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fact that judges do not much consider theory, according to these scholars,
makes it possible to read judicial decisions for their theoretical subtext.'°
"[Dioctrine is generated not by any abstract methodological or
theoretical concern, but by the pictures that judges have in their
heads.... These pictures, or narratives, are shaped by underlying
political visions, that is, belief structures about how society is and ought
to be organized."" These scholars attempt to understand what those
"underlying political visions" are and use this understanding to comment
on both doctrine and the validity and usefulness of those visions.'2
This Article relies on a similar assumption about international law.
A number of different international law and international relations
theories argue that the interests of states are shaped by norms and ideas
that exist in the international community.'3 What states want, and what




13. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE
L.J. 2599, 2633-34 (1997). Koh found that
[u]nlike interest theorists, who tend to treat state interests as given, "constructivists"
have long argued that states and their interests are socially constructed by "commonly
held philosophic principles, identities, norms of behavior, or shared terms of
discourse." Rather than arguing that state actors and interests create rules and norms,
constructivists argue that "[rules and norms constitute the international game by
determining who the actors are, what rules they must follow if they wish to ensure that
particular consequences follow from specific acts, and how titles to possessions can be
established and transferred."
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original). See generally Alexander Wendt, Constructing
International Politics, 20 INT'L SEcuRrrY 71 (1995) (reviewing a neorealist critique of critical
international relations theory); Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the
International State, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 384 (1994) (arguing that state identity changes in
response to systemic interactions); Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of
Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49 (1993)
(discussing Regime Theory in light of traditional European thought on international law).
Although Koh criticizes constructivism as unable to explain "the transmission belt" of
norms to domestic policy, he and other writers in the transnational legal process tradition rely on a
similar assumption about the importance of norms and ideas in international law constraining
domestic behavior.
[Koh's] model of "transnational legal process" ... argues ... that compliance with
international rules is not explained entirely by the functional benefits it provides but,
rather, by the process of internalization of international legal norms into the internal
value sets of domestic legal systems ....
... [T]his idea [is] a central feature of his model.
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory. A New
Generation ofnterdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 381 (1999).
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function of what individuals and organizations think and what other
states want.'4 The state is "socially constructed."'5 These norms and
ideas underlie the decisions states and other actors make when forming
policy.
Of particular interest here is a group of scholars often referred to as
the World Society School.'6 Their core insight is to use contemporary
sociological institutionalism to examine why states are surprisingly
similar to one another in terms of their organizational framework and
often their policies.'7 The World Society School is "trying to account for
a world whose societies, organized as nation-states, are structurally
similar in many unexpected dimensions and change in unexpectedly
similar ways."' 8 These scholars argue that a set of norms which develop
internationally-in the "rationalized world institutional and cultural
order"-shape national decision-making.'9  This rationalized order
14. See Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism:
Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19, 26
(2000).
15. See id.
16. While the World Society School is in some ways different from constructivism, both
groups come from the common sociological tradition and argue that national policy and identity
are socially constructed in world society and world culture:
Of course, [the World Society] approach is broadly constructivist in that we argue that
states are products of cultural and associational processes. But the approach advanced
in this Article qualifies (and supplements) conventional constructivist theories in
important respects. First, our approach differs sharply from bottom-up constructivist
models. Our model views states as shaped by cultural processes that are substantially
organized on a global level. This approach emphasizes the ways in which states reflect
their wider institutional environment. Second, our model identifies different social
mechanisms from those identified by traditional constructivist approaches. Rather than
emphasizing persuasion and habitualization as the processes through which institutions
influence state action, we stress the ways in which orthodoxy and mimicry shape state
identity, interests, and organizational structure. Finally, in terms of methodology, our
approach supplements, or perhaps serves as a corrective to, constructivist legal
scholarship by using empirical and quantitative methods that help specify when, under
what conditions, and to what extent, state behavior is shaped by social structure.
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereign(y, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1749, 1753 (2003); cf John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855, 857-62 (1998) (noting
the influence of Weber and Durkheim on constructivism, as well as noting more recent
developments); John W Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. Soc. 144,
145 (1997) ("Worldwide models define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the
structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors......
17. SeeMeyeretal., supmnote 16, at 145.
18. Id.
19. While they acknowledge that "states, organizations, and individuals also contribute to
the content and structure of world culture" World Society scholars focus on the way that world
society and culture shapes and controls states, organizations and individuals Id.I at 150-51.
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consists not only of states, but also of international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), cultural influences, professional
associations, and epistemic communities in thousands of areas. 0
The question, then, is how. The rationalized world institutional
order impacts national policies in three major ways: (1) international
society constructs the identity and purpose of nation-states by providing
recognition-formal and informal-to nation-states that fit certain ideas,
and by serving as models that other nations mimetically reproduce;
(2) international society actively maintains that identity through the
advice and aid of other nation-states, international organizations, and
nonstate actors; and (3) international society legitimizes individuals who
wish to push their own states toward international standards.' Most of
the work of the World Society scholars is dedicated to explaining how
specific internationally determined norms explain policies in individual
countries at different levels of development and in very different cultural
milieus. Studies have shown everything from female enrollment in
education,2 2 demographic record-keeping technology,23 the existence of
science policy review boards,24 and the structure of military forces,25 to
20. From the perspective of a single national polity, the outside world consists of much
more than a "system of states" or "world economy" or "international system." Rather, the global
environment is a sea teeming with a great variety of social units-states and their associated
polities, military alliances, business enterprises, social movements, terrorists, political activists,
NGOs-all of which may be involved in relations with the polity. Some of these actors are seen
as beneficial, others as antagonistic. In either case, they are all part of the larger world and must
be dealt with in some way:
Besides actors, the world polity contains raw materials, labor, manufactured products,
scientific knowledge and other resources .... It contains structures of rules regarding
access to those resources and theories explaining why they are essential .... [T]he
world polity contains complex sets of rules... regarding how the polity can and should
structure its relations to the larger world .... Some rules are formal and explicit, such
as rules of positive international law, contracts, and interstate organizations. Others are
informal, such as international customary law, state "practice" and generalized
expectations regarding what states and other actors may and ought to do.
Finally, the world polity contains a multitude of even more loosely structured
"cultural" elements.
John Boli, Sovereignty from a World Polity Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY 53, 59-60
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (citations omitted).
21. See Meyer et al., supm note 16, at 157.
22. See Karen Bradley & Francisco 0. Ramirez, World Polity and Gender Paity:
Women " Share ofHigher Education, 1965-1985, 11 REs. SOC. EDUC. & SOCtALtzATION 63, 63-91
(1996).
23. See CONNIE L. MCNEELY, CONSTRUCTING THE NATION STATE: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND PRESCRIPTIw ACTION 73-115 (1995).
24. See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 34-68
(1996).
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267the existence of welfare systems" or constitutions,27 varies along with
international standards, rather than in response to domestic needs, and
can be explained by the influence of World Society through these three
mechanisms.
Most of this research comparatively examines national policies in
an issue area and then determines whether there is international
coherence, and whether changes in a few nations reverberate through the
international system.28 This works extremely well for specific policies
with easily observable variables. It is not necessarily well suited,
however, to explain how more general ideas about the nature of politics
influence policy. Since this Article seeks to identify the dominant idea of
"the state" in the world polity, it must employ a different methodology.
A technique and an assumption similar to that of the constitutional
law theorists described above provide a method for answering these
questions. The assumption is that the U.N. effort to build an entirely new
political unit in Kosovo reveals how international policy makers
conceived of a state. The technique is to analyze the decisions made by
the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), NATO, the European Union, their constitutive
members, NGOs, and individuals in shaping post-war Kosovo through
the lens of international law theory, just as constitutional law theorists
examine judicial opinions through the lens of political theory. The
process of setting up UNMIK serves as a natural experiment. In creating
a "state," the international community almost necessarily had to reveal its
underlying ideas about what a state is and how a state operates.
II. DISAGGREGATED SOVEREIGNTY AND UNMIK: APPLYING THE
METHODOLOGY
Inside the legal academy, one of the dominant fin de siecle ideas
about the nature of the state was the notion of disaggregated sovereignty.
Following Kenneth Abbott's call to arms for a connection between
international law and international relations, a group of law scholars
25. See Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from
Sociology Institutionalism, 50 INT'L ORG. 325, 336-37 (1996).
26. See id. at 336; Andrew Abbott & Staley DeViney, The Welfare State as Transnational
Event. Evidence from Sequences of Policy Adoption, 16 Soc. Sci. HIsT. 245, 245-46, 266, 269
(1992).
27. John Boli, World Polity Sources of Expanding State Authority and Organizations,
1870-1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE, SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
(George Thomas et al. eds., 1987).
28. See sources cited supra notes 22-27.
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began plumbing the idea of "Liberalism" in international relations.29 Led
by Anne-Marie Slaughter, these scholars argued that the modem liberal
state was not, as Realist international relations (IR) scholars argued, a
unified, rational actor possessing freedom of action over a defined area
due to its sovereignty. The state's actions were, and are, not merely
efforts to defend its predefined interests in an anarchic world." Nor were
the modern liberal state's interests and policies defined merely by the
interplay of domestic political actors.' Rather, modem liberal
democracies are a compendium of interests-governmental ministries,
agencies and officials, independent regulatory bodies, nongovernmental
actors, and citizens-working in networks to create policy in a variety of
fields. 2 The insight of these scholars was to argue that these substate
level actors not only related to one another domestically, but also created
policy internationally. In other words, substate actors in modern liberal
democracies worked across borders to make international policy. This
was, in Slaughter's famous phrase, "the real new world order.""
This idea of the state animated the creation and structure of
UNMIK. Moreover, the introduction of a certain meme to the general
"disaggregated sovereignty" concept-that it is possible to expand the
"club of democracy" through links between individual agencies in
constitutional democratic states with those in nondemocratic nonliberal
ones-was the intellectual bridge that justified the adoption of
disaggregated sovereignty as a governing ideology for UNMIK 4 This is
not to say that the scholarship inspired the structure of UNMIK. Rather,
the scholarship was representative of the dominant mode of thinking
about what "states" were in the post-cold war, post-Westphalian system
of the late 1990s. And that mode of thinking was responsible for the
structure of UNMIK.
This finding should influence World Society literature. Most of the
scholarship in this area has sought (1) to prove that ideas are
29. See Kenneth W Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 338, 340, 342 (1989); Slaughter et al., supra note
13, at 367; see also David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335, 388-89 (2000).
30. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EtUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 508 (1995).
31. See id
32. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183,
184 (1997); Anne-Marie Burley, LawAmong Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act
ofState Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907, 1917 n.25 (1992).
33. See Slaughter, supra note 32, at 183.
34. Compare Burley, supra note 32, at 1921, with Slaughter, supra note 32, at 185.
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disseminated throughout the world, (2) identify the means by which this
is done, and (3) evaluate the effectiveness of those means for diffusing
ideas internationally. This Article points to another question: what types
of ideas travel and which do not. Ultimately, this Article argues that one
crucial factor in answering that question lies in the structure of the ideas
themselves. Over time, disaggregated sovereignty scholars espoused the
belief that liberal states could reproduce themselves in nonliberal areas
by linking the subgovernmental institutions of the liberal state to those of
the nonliberal state. This belief resulted in the use of the disaggregated
sovereignty idea of state as the basis for forming a new state.
Previous ideas of state were different, not only in their content but
in their structure. The dominant idea of state during the League of
Nations Mandate System of the interwar period-the last major period of
international state-building-held, as a matter of definition, that Western
states could not be fully replicated in the developing world." As a result,
the League of Nations did not try to replicate European states in full
form in non-European settings. Despite similar institutional frameworks
for the dissemination of ideas, the differences in the content of those
ideas changed when they were transmitted. 6 The World Society
literature, which, for the most part, treats the expansion of certain ideas
as a result of sociological factors, ignores the effect ideas themselves play
in their own expansion.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part III examines
the rise of disaggregated sovereignty as an idea and charts its changes
over time. Part IV examines the structure of UNMIK and argues that it is
organized along the ideas of disaggregated sovereignty theorists. Part V
concludes the Article by discussing how the questions raised by the
relationship between international state-building and ideas of state should
impact World Society literature.
III. THE RISE OF DISAGGREGATED SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW SCHOLARSHIP
To show that the conception of the state behind the disaggregated
sovereignty literature heavily influenced the institutional design of
UNMIK, it is important to establish exactly what that idea of the state
35. See Antony Anghie, Colonilism and the Birth of Internatonal Instuons:
Sovereignty, Economy and the Mandate System of the League ofNations, 34 N.YU. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 513,533-36 (2002).
36. Id.
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is." Doing so will reveal that the conception of the state in the
disaggregated sovereignty literature actually consists of a number of
different elements, many of which are shared by the other important
modes of thinking in modem international law theory, especially
"transnational legal process" theory.
A. International Relations and International Law. History and Primer
New theoretical paradigms rarely fit the end of historical periods as
neatly as the use of IR theory to deal with international law fit the end of
the Cold War. The period in American public international law theory
dating from the end of World War II to 1989 was marked by the "80
miles of 1-95" distinction between the Columbia and New Haven schools
of thought.38 The New Haven School, led primarily by Myres McDougal
and Harold Lasswell, developed a response to the IR realists who thought
that the behavioral "norms" which comprise international law were
largely epiphenomenal. 9  The New Haven School argued that
international law was not a set of rules created by norms of behavior but
rather the result of the need for policy-makers to make an "authoritative
decision" about international issues." Norms were not the guiding force
of international law-policy was. To them, policy was "a category of
judgment and political management standing outside of hard and soft
law, rules and principles."' The search for better policy was to be done
through "empirical knowledge analyzed by reference to purposive
outcome." 2 The pursuit of knowledge by decision-makers aimed at
achieving world order and human dignity created international law."3 The
defense of international law rested on a defense of these principles,
which led the New Haven School to resist communism and to justify
military actions that served to protect civil liberties and rights.'
37. Again, it should be noted that this Article makes no claim that the literature itself
impacted the structure of UNMIK. Rather, its claim is that the set of ideas of which legal
scholarship was a representative part influenced the structure of UNMIK.
38. See Kennedy, supm note 29, at 380-90.
39. See id.
40. See id; see also 1 HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE
FOR A FREE SOCIETY 24-25 (1992).
41. Kennedy, supm note 29, at 384; see, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46
AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1952).
42. Richard A. Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104
YALE L.J. 1991, 1992 (1991).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2002-03 ("McDougal and Lasswell had an early and historically prophetic grasp
on the fundamental ideological struggle of the last half-century, and they resolved it in favor of
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The Columbia School, led by Louis Henkin and others, believed
that international law, while not providing a strict set of rules, provided a
number of norms that allowed for the peaceful coexistence of different
types of peoples and states in the world.5 Columbia School scholars
believed that international organizations, especially the United Nations,
could provide the flexible management necessary for peaceful
coexistence." While out of favor with most important policy-makers
outside of the U.N. system after 1960, the Columbia School dominated
the thinking of academics and international lawyers, "emphasizing
norms over policy and international community over the interests of
sovereigns." 7
After the Cold War, though, neither resolute anticommunism nor
detente seemed like necessary goals for the study or content of
international law. Kenneth Abbott's seminal article, Modem
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers,
was written just before the fall of the Berlin Wall. 8 Rather than continue
to question what international law should look like in a bipolar world, it
aimed to create a deeper explanation for why international law exists in
the first place.49 Abbott argued that international law analysis was under-
theorized; it had skipped the question of why states create international
law to work on the issue of what that international law should be." The
existence of international law needed to be explained, he argued, and to
do so, international lawyers should turn to international relations theory,
which "seek[s] to explain the underlying bases of conflict and
cooperation in international politics."51 This was a direct indictment of
the Columbia School-the international law establishment among
academics and lawyers-which he thought was unable to respond to the
criticisms leveled by Realist international relations scholars. 2 What
Abbott sought to do, though, was to co-opt the logic of international
relations critics of international law, and harness it into a set of
justifications for international agreements. 3 By appearing in 1989, with
the West in a manner that has been abundantly validated but that was by no means self-evident
when initially articulated.").
45. See Kennedy, supm note 29, at 383.
46. See id
47. Id.
48. Abbott, supra note 29 (published summer 1989; the Berlin Wall fell Nov. 9, 1989).
49. Seeid at 335-40.
50. Seeid at 336-37.
51. See id. at 340.
52. Seeid
53. See id at 405.
190
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the future of world politics unclear, this call for a renewal and a
justification of international law had deep effects.
Abbott's own theory was drawn from one branch of international
relations: Regime Theory, or Institutionalism." This theory is based on
the basic assumptions of Realist international relations that states are
sovereign, unitary, rational actors driven solely by the pursuit of their
national interests and that the world system is characterized by anarchy.55
Realists used these assumptions to argue that no international law could
bind states because, when rules worked against the interests of a state, it
simply would not follow them.56 Institutionalists used game theory and
market failure analogies to explain why nations developed "regimes"
governed by international law." International norms were created, Abbott
argued, to allow rational self-interested states to work together, much the
way contracts and commercial norms allowed businesses to work
together. 8 International law existed because it helped these autonomous
states further their interests.59
Although Institutionalist research in international law continues,' it
was quickly supplemented by efforts to use other branches of
international relations for the types of formal, deep explanations and
resultant policy prescriptions Abbott had suggested were necessary for
international law.61 Most notable of these was the connection between IR
Liberalism and international law, which took its most advanced form in
Anne-Marie Slaughter's work on disaggregated sovereignty."
54. See id at 388.
55. See id. at 346-51.
56. See id. at 337-88.
57. Id. at 405-07.
58. See id. at 405.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Kenneth W Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Thmugh Formal
International Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3 (1998); Mary Ellen O'Connell, New
InternationalLegal Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 334 (1999).
61. SeeAbbott, supm note 29, at 335-40.
62. Kennedy, supra note 29, at 388-89.
These scholars, the leading "new" scholars of my generation-people like Koh,
Slaughter, Alvarez, Kingsbury, and Teson, many of them law school classmates,
friends, and colleagues-urge movement toward a new understanding of international
community and a new appreciation for an anti-formalist international law. In the new
post-Cold War world, they reaffirm some of the field's most familiar and dogmatic
propositions: that sovereignty has eroded, that international law should be understood
politically, that the boundary between international and municipal law is porous, that
international law may not be as universal as it pretends, and that the international
regime is better understood as a process or multilevel game than as government by
legal norms. They have taken ideas that have been part of disciplinary common sense
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Liberalism in international relations starts with radically different
assumptions than does Realism, the dominant mode of IR theory for
most of the second half of the twentieth century. Rooted in the Kantian
idea of "perpetual peace," Liberalism abandons the idea of the state as a
unitary, self-interested actor in an anarchical world.63 Instead, the theory
studies the actions of individuals:
Liberals insist on methodological individualism, viewing individuals and
private groups as the fundamental actors in international (and domestic)
politics. States are not insignificant, but their preferences are determined
by domestic politics rather than assumed interests or material factors like
relative power. This approach implies that interstate politics are more
complex and fluid than realists and institutionalists assume: national
preferences can vary widely and change unpredictably. It calls for careful
attention to the domestic politics and constitutional structures of individual
states-a daunting prospect for analysts of international relations.
64
A theory that relies on the mechanisms of domestic politics to
systematically explain the behavior of states internationally must develop
assumptions and beliefs about how states work internally. This has long
been the focus of international law scholarship. Starting as it does with
the general assumption of state sovereignty, international law theory has
had to explain why states comply with international law when it is not in
their direct interest. 65 Louis Henkin famously observed that "almost all
nations observe almost all principles of international law... almost all of
the time."6 Exactly why this is true, however, has been a crucial problem
in international law.
Just as some scholars were starting to apply liberal IR theory to
international law, Harold Koh and others were creating a set of ideas to
deal with the compliance problem under the banner of "transnational
legal process. 67 Although Koh comes from a different starting point, his
for a century-pragmatism, anti-formalism, interdisciplinarity-and turned them into a
fighting faith. This methodological self-confidence announces a political optimism:
the end of the Cold War will complete the internationalist project, inaugurating a
humanitarian "civil society"--an "international community" that will dethrone the
state, welcome wider participation, and open international law to the political.
ld
63. See Burley, supra note 32, at 1914-17 (discussing Kantian ideals).
64. Kenneth Abbott, International Relations Theory International Law, and the Regime
GoverningAtrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 361, 366 (1999).
65. See Koh, supr note 13, at 2655.
66. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
67. See Koh, supra note 13, at 2645-46.
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work shares many of the beliefs of liberal IR theory about the attributes
of states that make them comply with international legal norms.
In international law, Liberals usually examine how liberal states-
democracies with market economies that protect basic human rights-
behave.68 Although it is sometimes difficult to define exactly who is and
who is not part of the club of liberal states," Liberals assert an empirical
claim that power in these states is diffused to various constituent parts of
government. "The state is not disappearing, but disaggregating into its
separate, functionally distinct parts."7 To understand how policy is made
in a specific area, it is as necessary to look at the network of various
government officials who work in that area as it is to look at the policies
of the head of state. Further, they argue, "These parts-courts,
regulatory agencies, executives and even legislatures-are networking
with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that
constitutes a new, transgovernmental order."'" The future of international
law lays in the complex relations between these subgovernmental parts,
not in the relationships between sovereign leaders, big or powerful
international organizations, or the power of global civil society.2
While this understanding of state policy-making will be explored in
more depth in Part III.B, it can be seen from even this simple explanation
that this understanding overlaps with-but is not identical to--
transnational legal process ideas on how states operate. Transnational
legal process theorists argue that institutionalists, liberal IR theorists, and
constructivists are all right to some extent about why states obey
international law.73 According to Koh, international rules are made
through an iterative, or repetitious, process." First, transnational actors-
individual policy entrepreneurs who may be part of the government-
68. See Slaughter, supra note 30, at 508.
69. Koh, supra note 13, at 2650.
Its essentialist analysis treats a state's identity as somehow exogenously or permanently
given. Yet as constructivist scholars have long recognized, national identities, like
national interests, are socially constructed products of learning, knowledge, cultural
practices, and ideology. Nations such as South Africa, Poland, Argentina, Chile, and
the Czech Republic are neither permanently liberal nor illiberal, but make transitions
back and forth from dictatorship to democracy, prodded by norms and regimes of
international law.
Id. (citation omitted).
70. Slaughter, supra note 32, at 184.
71. Id. at 185.
72. Id. at 183-85.
73. See Koh, supra note 13, at 2646.
74. See id
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interact with one another, creating or interpreting international norms."
By doing so, they insert themselves into their domestic "internal
normative system." 6 This creates a rule which countries will follow to
the extent it has been internalized in its domestic idea-set. The more this
process takes place, the firmer the rules become. "[E]ventually, repeated
participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests and even
the identities of the participants in the process. '7' This process, though,
relies on a vision of states that is not unitary: individual policy actors-
and not rational, unitary states-are given the lead position in negotiating
norms in transnational space.
Koh excoriates liberal IR scholars for treating the creation of liberal
states as exogenous and thereby missing the idea of how international
law forms the liberal identity of states." He claims that liberal IR
scholars ignore the ways nonliberal states obey international law, which
runs into empirical problems (nonliberal states often do obey
international law) and normative ones (denying the universality of
international law).79  However, if one cabins discussion to how
acknowledged liberal states behave among themselves and ignores how
they change over time, it is hard to distinguish transnational legal process
from liberal international relations/international law (IR/IL) thinking.
The state is not a unified actor pursuing its interests. Instead, a state is
composed of many subsets of actors, all of which negotiate and discuss
issues internationally in complicated issue webs, and which then




78. See id. at 2650.
79. Id
Identity analysis leaves unanswered the critical, constructivist question: To what extent
does compliance with international law itself help consttute the identty of a state as a
law-abiding state, and hence, as a "liberal" state? Furthermore, the notion that "only
liberal states do law with one another" can be empirically falsified, particularly in areas
such as international commercial law, where states tend to abide fastidiously by
international rules without regard to whether they are representative democracies.
Moreover, like the discredited "cultural relativist" argument in human rights, the claim
that nonliberal states somehow do not participate in a zone of law denies the
universalism of international law and effectively condones the confinement of
nonliberal states to a realist world of power politics.
Id. (citation omitted).
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which maintain their monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but it is
created through the negotiations and interactions of substate parts."
These ideas and their similar conceptions of the state have gained
great prominence in international law theory. The history of this rise has
been relentlessly chronicled.8' Rather than repeat this extensive project
of intellectual history, the next Part will flesh out the conception of a
state in disaggregated sovereignty theory and show how this conception
changed over time before proceeding to explain that conception's role in
shaping UNMIK.
B. Disentangling Disaggregated Sovereignty.- Four Themes
Although the last Part discussed why disaggregated sovereignty
theorists think liberal states create more law than nonliberal ones, it did
not explore what attributes render a state "liberal." Because the IR/IL
literature is massive and most authors are almost infinitely vague about
their answer to this question, I am going to follow the work of the
unquestioned leader in the field: Anne-Marie Slaughter. Through a
close reading of four of her most prominent articles on the subject, I will
attempt to make clear what conception of state lies at the core of the
disaggregated sovereignty literature and how this idea changed over time.
Through a series of articles in the 1990s, Slaughter laid out a
detailed map of how liberal states behave in international law." She was
intentionally vague, however, about what constitutes a liberal state.83 By
reasoning backwards, however, we can explore what traits a liberal state
must have in order to engage in international law-making of the type
Slaughter describes.
Before doing so, though, it is important to note that as defined by
both IR and IL/IR scholars, "Liberalism" is a method and not a
80. To be fair, Koh puts a great deal more emphasis on the role of civil society, but his
idea of the state, the crucial question for this Article, is the same. See, e.g., id. at 2651-54
(discussing why Israel participated in the Oslo process).
81. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
TransgovemmentalNetworks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 24 (2002);
Don Suh, Situating Liberalism in Trausnational Legal Space, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 605,
618 (2002); Anne Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347, 353 (2001); Slaughter et al., supra note 13, at 367. This is only a very
partial list.
82. Slaughter recently released a book that summarizes a great deal of this literature.
ANNE-MARm SLAUGHTER, NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). However, because it came after the event
at issue-the founding of UNMIK-it will not be discussed here.
83. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Crtique of Slaughters
Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183, 193 (2001).
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definition of state policy or type." "Liberal international relations theory
applies to all States. Totalitarian governments, authoritarian
dictatorships, and theocracies can all be depicted as representatives of
some subset of actors in domestic and transnational society, even if it is a
very small or particularistic domestic slice."85 As a method, "Liberalism"
separates itself from "Realism" by arguing that regime type matters. In
the classic Realist model, states, no matter who governs, how they
govern, or how the leaders of the state were selected, behave in the same
fashion in an international context.86 Liberalism rejects the idea of the
autonomous state and replaces it with contextual analysis of how
different types of regimes act.87 The crucial players are substate actors:
individuals, governmental bureaucracies, and NGOs.88 "If Realists focus
on States as monolithic entities in their interaction with other States
within an anarchic international system, Liberals focus primarily on
State-society relations." 9
Andrew Morascavik, perhaps the leading proponent of Liberalism
in international relations, argued that the method was reducible to three
basic postulates: (1) individuals and privately constituted groups are the
central actors in world politics; (2) all regimes are influenced by at least
some group of domestic interests; and (3) the behavior of states reflects
the preferences of the individual actors who comprise and influence the
state."
This type of analysis can be used to analyze any type of regime
because individuals are players in even the most autocratic state. It is
particularly useful, though, for understanding modem democracies
because it is both easier to see and more important to understand the
behavior of individuals in a system that gives them formal decision-
making authority. IR/IL scholars have created a large body of work on
how this specific type of state (henceforth referred to as a "liberal state")
operates and makes law in an international context.
84. See Slaughter, supm note 30, at 509.
85. Id.
86. Id at 506.
87. See id at 508.
88. See id.
89. Id
90. See Andrew Moravcsik, Libealism and International Relations Theory 6, 9, 11
(Working Paper, Ctr. for Int'l Affairs, Harvard Univ., 1992), cited in Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, International Law and Internaional Relations: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205,
227 (1993).
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Liberalism has both positive and normative aspects.' It is hard to
separate the positive predictions about how liberal states behave from the
clear belief among liberal scholars that this behavior is good. The
positive analysis about how liberal states behave serves as the basis for
normative suggestions about how states become more liberal.92
Moreover, the decision to split liberal states into a separate category has
been accused of being highly politically charged. 3 For the purposes of
this Article, it is enough to say that the theory, as adopted by international
policy-makers, was both positive (in that it provided a description of how
modem capitalist democracies behaved) and normative (in that its
description of the world and international policy-making was generally
seen as a good thing for those states).'
Through analyzing Slaughter's four major articles on the subject, it
is possible to see the contours of Liberalism's view of liberal states at the
end of the twentieth century.
91. See Burley, supra note 32, at 1910 ("The liberal internationalist model can be used
interpretively, predictively, and normatively.").
92. See Alvarez, supm note 83, at 189 ("Notwithstanding normative disclaimers,
Slaughter's sympathies for the law-making regimes and political institutions of the West are never
in doubt. The political message liberal theory conveys to international policy-makers is not
subtle: 'hopes for international order should be pinned on our hopes for democracy."' (quoting
Anne-Marie Burley, Towardan Age ofLiberal Nations, 33 HARV INT'L L.J. 393,403 (1992)).
93. See id at 192 ("Harsher critiques have emerged from some of those who consider
themselves as either 'critical' legal scholars ... or scholars of the 'sub-altern' or the 'post-
colonial.' For these critics, liberal theory ... is the oppressive voice of neo-liberal hegemony."
(emphasis omitted)).
94. It should also be noted that this paper is uninterested in the truth-value of liberal
claims or the advisability of policies promoted by those who use liberalism normatively.
Determining the importance of the theory is enough. That said, I should note the contours of this
argument. Jos6 Alvarez, among others, has challenged the claims that (1) liberal states make
more law with one another than do nonliberal ones and (2) that liberal states are less likely to go
to war with one another. Alvarez claims that the argument that transnational governance networks
have created a lot of international policy by claiming that "Slaughter builds her theory ... on a
selective compiling of very recent evidence while ignoring ... notorious counterexamples." Id at
220. This seems right but not entirely inconsistent with Slaughter's argument is that something
has changed very recently and that the development of governance networks is piecemeal and not
complete. Moreover, evidence has piled up that governance networks have been increasing in
scope, if fitfully. See, e.g., Raustiala, supm note 81, at 5 3-54; David Schleicher, Book Review,
Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C Schaffer s Tansatlantic Governance h7 the Global Economy, 43
HARV. INT'L L.J. 605, 608 (2002). Alvarez also argues that, because Slaughter is unable to explain
why a Kantian perpetual peace exists between liberal states, her arguments about how to use this
evidence (which he also disputes) are weak. SeeAlvarez, supa note 83, at 235-38. Moreover, he
claims that differentiating between liberal and nonliberal states just gives liberal states license to
go to war with nonliberal ones. Neither of these criticisms says much to Slaughter's central
empirical claim, which is that the existence of a "zone of peace" makes it likely that there is also a
"zone of law."
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1. LawAmong Liberal States. Liberal Internatonalism and the Act
of State Doctrine (1992) 9'
Slaughter's first major article on the subject was a discussion of the
Act of State doctrine in American law.9 She sought to unravel a classical
theoretical problem in American law: American courts refused to
challenge the validity of the laws of communist and other unfriendly,
nondemocratic states, but were more than willing to overrule laws of
friendly democratic countries through ordinary conflict of laws rules.97
To explain this, Slaughter turned to differences between these types of
states.
The basic source of her argument was Kant's The Eternal Peace.98
Kant argued that in a world characterized by liberal republics with
representative governments, a law of nations based on federalism
between these republics and "a cosmopolitan law establishing the right of
universal hospitality" could avoid war indefinitely.99 Slaughter notes that
this had, in a way, come to pass: international relations scholars had
spent years developing statistical models to show that, with very few
exceptions, liberal democracies did not go to war with one another.'"
From this massive data project, scholars made two relatively simple
findings: (1) liberal states were fundamentally different from nonliberal
95. Burley, supra note 32, at 1907.
96. Seeid. at 1910.
97. See id.
Deceptively simple to formulate, the act of state doctrine has nevertheless presented a
perennial challenge for scholars and practitioners determined to unravel the mysteries
of its evolutiontand application. From a liberal internationalist perspective, however,
the doctrine appears to embody exactly the paradox predicted by the liberal
internationalist model, which I will henceforth call the sovereignty paradox. On the
one hand, at least until 1989, U.S. courts were willing to "respect the independence" of
states such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Iran, Libya, Cuba and the former Soviet
Union-allowing challenged acts by these states to stand unreviewed even when they
clearly contravened U.S. law. On the other hand, in cases involving challenged acts of
states such as Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand and Switzerland, U.S. courts have either evaluated the validity of the
challenged act under U.S. or foreign law or chosen to override the foreign law based on
superior U.S. interests.
Id
98. Id. at 1914 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE PILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT'S
MORAL AND POLMCAL WRITINGS 430-76 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., Random House 1949) (1795)).
99. Id. (citing KANT, supra note 98, at 446).
100. For this proposition, Slaughter cites the work of Michael Doyle. Id. at 1914-15; see
Michael W Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHiL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 206
(1983); Michael W Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics, 80 AM. POL. So. REV. 1151, 1155-56
(1986).
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states, and (2) the lack of conflict between liberal states was a function of
this difference."'
Slaughter's innovation was to argue that these findings, based on
political and military relations among states, "apply equally to
international legal relations."'02 She argued that courts were willing to
review the law of other liberal states because liberal states existed in a
"zone of law," characterized by mutual recognition of the rule of law,
dialogue between courts, and because there was no threat that legal
disputes would result in war."' Conflicts of laws were just that and not
conflicts between nations.' " Courts would not overrule the decisions of
nonliberal states because relations between liberal and nonliberal states
took place in a "zone of politics."' 5 The decisions of nonliberal states
were not easily translatable into the American discourse of law, and
overlaying any dispute between a liberal and a nonliberal state was the
possibility that the dispute would lead to war.'6 American courts do not
use ordinary conflict of laws to deal with the decisions of nonliberal
states because their decisions are not "legal" in any meaningful sense.'
7
Slaughter argued that the Act of State doctrine served as the "tacit line of
demarcation between" the liberal zone of law and the nonliberal zone of
politics."'
This, of course, begged the question: what is a liberal state?
Slaughter defined it as a state "with juridical equality, constitutional
protections of individual rights, representative republican governments,
and market economies based on private property rights."'" This is a
static definition; it would fit the United States as well in 1890 as it did in
1990. It provides little help in determining what the popular conception
of liberal states was at the time of the creation of UNMIK. However,
Slaughter's paper made one central idea explicit: liberal states are
different from nonliberal ones."'  As we will see, this concept was
relaxed in later articles, and the intellectual move this represented
explains a great deal about the structure of UNMIK. Further, Slaughter's
101. SeeBurley, supmnote 32, at 1916.
102. Id.
103. Id at 1917.
104. See id. at 1918-20.
105. Id. at 1920.
106. Seeid at 1921.
107. Seeid
108. Id. at 1952-53.
109. Id. at 1909.
110. Id
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paper emphasizes relations between substate entities across borders-in
this case courts-which makes clear Slaughter's insistence that the
foreign policy of states is made by a variety of actors, including
nondemocratically elected technocrats like judges, exercising power at
different levels in international and national systems and not just by
foreign ministers or presidents.
2. International Law and nternatonal Relatons: A DualAgenda
(1993)
In an article Slaughter wrote just one year later, her earlier simple,
static definition of liberal states was replaced with a sense that some
major changes were going on in the relationships between liberal states
in the post-Cold War world."' Slaughter's article began by explaining
how "the Realist challenge" shaped the discussion between international
relations and international law for the entire period of the Cold War."2
Slaughter argued that the traditional debate between international law
scholars and IR experts had lost most of its urgency because of the end of
the Cold War and the increasing amount and importance of international
law in the late 1980s and early 1990s."' This period, right before and
after the end of the Cold War, was marked by the rise of international law
and international relations scholarship under the rubric of Institu-
tionalism."'
This rich vein of scholarship in both international relations and
international law was well-suited for explaining a number of different
phenomena in international law, especially treaty formation."' Slaughter
argued that by 1993, Institutionalism had run its course as well."6 While
Institutionalism was useful at explaining some things, any theory that
depended on the basic tenets of Realism, she argued, was limited in its
usefulness because of changes in the world happening in the early
1990s."' First, "Institutionalism cannot take account of individual-state
relations, either domestic or transnational, or transnational individual-
individual relations. It thus cannot provide a politico-economic theory to
help conceptualize and analyze the law that regulates these relations.""'
111. See Burley, supm note 90, at 207-16.
112. Id at 207-09.
113. Id. at 220-26.
114. Id. at 220-24.
115. Id.
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These issues, she argued, were of increasing importance as both
economic behavior and the legal regulation of that economic behavior
became more and more internationalized."' Further, Institutionalism
could not explain the democratic peace."' This, too, was an increasingly
significant flaw because of the dramatic increase in the number of
democratic states.'2'
Slaughter argued that researchers should turn to Liberalism as
model to look at the problems of contemporary IRJIL. 22 Although
Liberalism can be used to understand any type of state, Slaughter's
argument about its usefulness in relation to institutionalism was based on
the fact that Liberalism would be a more effective lens to look at the
characteristic issues of a world full of liberal states.'23 Realism could
explain, perhaps, relations between nuclear-armed superpowers and
Institutionalism could explain peace treaty creation and the formation of
large international institutions.' 24  Neither, however, was particularly
useful in a world where states simply did not want to go to war with one
another and where most important international regulation did not
happen through large international treaties but through coordination
among individuals and regulators.
2
1
When discussing the problems of the use of Liberalism in
international law, Slaughter asked:
A second problem concerns the relative power of Liberalism versus
Realism and Institutionalism. Even assuming that Liberals do succeed in
formulating substantive theoretical propositions, under what conditions
will those propositions explain more than Realism and Institutionalism? In
other words, even if Liberal propositions offer a more accurate description
of empirical phenomena, do they ultimately add anything to our ability to
explain and predict such phenomena? If not, why displace the relative
parsimony and power of Realism and Institutionalism?
26
119. Id at 226.
120. Id. at 225-26.
121. Id. at 226.
122. Id. at 226-27.
123. Id at 228-30.
124. Id. at 237-38.
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
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Underlying these questions is an inherent philosophical pragmatism.',7 In
this view, Liberalism is not better or more true than Institutionalism or
Realism on an absolute scale. It simply may be more useful for creating
answers to the problems facing the world in 1993. For the purposes of
this Article, it is not important whether Liberalism actually provided
good solutions for contemporary international legal problems. Rather,
we look to Slaughter's assessment of what problems Liberalism might
seek to solve. It is here that the underlying assumptions about what
modern states look like lie.
Liberal scholarship, according to Slaughter, was particularly useful
for explaining the role which law, constitutions, and law-making by
courts play in modern states, particularly through comparative
constitutional analysis; commercial regulation by states of international
actors (so-called "transnational law"); international cooperation in the
creation of regulatory regimes; and the democratic peace among liberal
states. 8 These are the problems of liberal states. As Slaughter notes, "A
... final question is the extent to which transnational law can be
understood as a distinctive feature of law among liberal states."'29
Moreover, these problems are not the problems of liberal states
operating relatively independently of one another. In her model,
international transactions and mobility mean that efforts by states to
regulate behavior necessarily have to be cooperative and international in
scope if they are to be effective.'3 ° "Transnational law ... is growing
apace."'3' Courts have to react to these same forces because their
caseload is increasingly international and because the problems faced by
different countries-again as a result of economic, technological and
social changes-are largely the same.'32  Slaughter argued that it was
necessary to understand the law through an international lens because the
subjects of the law are now international.'33
Finally, the theme, advanced obliquely in the Act of State, that
substate actors in specific issue areas make foreign policy in conjunction
127. By philosophical pragmatism, I simply mean that the "truth" of ideas lies only in their
usefulness in solving concrete problems. The relationship between philosophical pragmatism and
the law (particularly legal realism) has been extensively chronicled. See generally Louis
MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001).
128. SeeBurley, supranote 90, at 228-38.
129. Id at 232.
130. See id at 230.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 230-32.
133. Seeid.
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with their counterparts in other countries, was enhanced. When
discussing legal policies, Slaughter does not mention Congress; it is the
courts, acting in concert with foreign courts, that have the onus of
responding to the problems created for private law regulation created by
globalization.' Similarly, it is regulators, working internationally, who
respond to the problem of creating international regulatory norms.'
Policy-making is, in this view, largely done by nonpolitical technocrats,
and the internationalization of problems leads to an internationalization
of technocratic policy-making. The model for this is clear: when
Slaughter looked at the world, she saw the European Union, with its
complex web of state-based and internationally appointed officials
working in harmony and toward harmonization. "'
3. International Law In a World ofLiberal States (1995)"7
Mid-decade, Slaughter's ideas about the current status of the liberal
state emerged in their fully formed version. In this piece in the European
Journal ofInternationalLaw, she hypothesized a world consisting only of
liberal states and attempted to explain what international law would look
like in such a world."' To do this, she had to define what makes a state
liberal and why this was a worthwhile project.
According to Slaughter, liberal states participating in a Kantian
eternal peace have six characteristics. 9 The first three-peace, liberal
democracy, and a market economy-were present in her definition of
liberal states in Act of State.'"° To these, she added three other traits,
changing the model into a discussion of what a liberal state was in the
post-Cold War world. The first was that liberal states formed "a dense
network of transnational transactions"'4 ' Rather than just having trade
ties, liberal states participating in a liberal peace shared "complex
interdependence," or connections at all levels of society, ranging from the
economic to the cultural and political.'42 Secondly, these states had high
levels of transnational communication or connections between low-level
134. See genemlly id
135. See generallyid
136. Id. at 238-39.
137. Slaughter, supra note 30, at 503.
138. Id at 514-15.
139. Id. at 511-12.
140. Id; seeBurley, supranote 32, at 1909.
141. Slaughter, supra note 30, at 512.
142. Id. at 513.
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government officials and government elites.' This was disaggregated
sovereignty, as "the more general phenomenon of transnational
communications among individuals and groups ... limits the ability of
foreign offices tightly to control governments' foreign relations."' "
Finally, these states have collapsed the "foreign/domestic" policy
distinction.45  Foreign policy is not just the "high politics" of war-
making, but is also economic and environmental policy that crosses state
lines.46
Within a world of liberal states, individuals and government
officials at all levels, through the pursuit of their own ends and visions of
public policy, create policy in different areas. Individual market actors
interact across state lines, choosing where to invest their money and
which law to be governed through contract law. In such a world, these
transactions and markets (and their effects) are not regulated merely by
individual states and strict rules of international law and international
organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO), but rather by
disaggregated parts of states. "The substantive legal rules applicable to a
particular class of individuals or groups or of conduct in transnational
society will thus be determined in the context of an interaction between
the individuals and groups involved and two or more governmental
institutions: courts, legislatures, executives, and administrative
agencies."'47 All law is international law and it is created, interpreted and
administered through a complex interaction between the governed and
the governments in which they are and, importantly, are not represented.
These institutions interact with one another not only along vertical
lines within individual states but also across state lines, making
international policy in areas like antitrust, environmental regulation, and
contract law in a complex, interdependent way. Courts create judicial
policy through transnational judicial contact and mutual recognition,
legislators discuss policy with one another without direct influence from
the state department or foreign ministry, and administrative bodies
engage each other to deal with the activities of transnational corporations
and to regulate transnational policy problems. They come together to
create solutions to specific problems, to create dialogue to handle future
143. Id.
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. See id. at 514.
146. Id.
147. Id at 523.
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problems and to generate model codes that can be incorporated into
domestic law.' 8
This, of course, creates enormous problems for traditional
understandings of sovereignty and democracy. Slaughter proposes a
redefinition of the idea of "the State" in international law and, hence, of
sovereignty. According to her, the state would be defined along the
following lines:
" The State is composed of multiple centers of political authority-
legislative, administrative, executive, and judicial; each of these
institutions operates in a dual regulatory and representative capacity
with respect to individuals and groups in domestic society.149
" Each is defined in terms of a specific set of functions it performs for
the members of domestic society, a set of functions that structures its
interaction with its coordinate branches as co-representatives of "the
people."
150
At the same time each of these institutions represents a facet of the
exercise of State power-making, implementing, and enforcing
regulations against individuals on behalf of the whole-the
proliferation of transnational economic and social transactions creates




The development of links between individuals and groups in
transnational society with the political institutions of multiple States
in turn generates contacts among these institutions, either directly or
indirectly; interactions among counterpart or coordinate institutions
from different States-court to court, court to legislature, legislature
to legislature, executive to court-are shaped by both an awareness of
a common or complementary function transcending a particular
national identity, and a simultaneous recognition of an obligation to
defend and promote the interests of a particular subset of individuals
and groups in transnational society.
1 2
The State is disaggregated, but remains the State: a constellation of
political institutions bound together by territory, text, history and
culture.
153
Sovereignty would then be a broad agreement not to violate these
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of such a redefined norm of sovereignty might thus be one of
noninterference with basic legislative, judicial, and executive functions
on the part of the component institutions of each State in the system.""'
This is a rich definition, replete with all sorts of theoretical interests and
problems. Most notably, it takes an empirical observation-that sub-state
institutions are creating foreign policy through their interactions with one
another in some liberal states in some areas-and uses it as a basis for a
new understanding of all of international law.'56
Slaughter's proposal takes a very American concept-separation of
powers-and grafts it onto the states of the entire world, most of which
(including most liberal states) are marked by far less division within their
governments. The state in Slaughter's International Law in a World of
Liberal States is defined by these divisions, and the composite parts of
these states are defined internationally through their relations with other
states.'57 Making noninterference with each different component part of
government crucial to the idea of sovereignty makes each governmental
institution equal and not interdependent. In American constitutional
terms, this is logical, even necessary. But for countries that feature
parliamentary supremacy or heavily executive focused administrative
states, this is an unnatural division. Moreover, it ignores the worry that
these institutions, unchecked, lack democratic accountability.
This last concern is mostly a product of the assumptions with which
she begins her paper. Her world of liberal states posits pre-existing,
legitimate liberal states, and as such, there is little concern about creating
legal rules that enforce democratic accountability and the legitimate
stability of government decision-making; these are assumed rather than
proved. Thus the model reads out of the world any concern about
creating legitimacy for the state.
International Law in a World of Liberal States provides the clearest
expression of the idea of disaggregated sovereignty."8 As will be seen
below, the state as it exists in this paper--comprised of internationally
defined component parts, marked by strong separation of powers and
functions, unconcerned about legitimacy, and with a legal system
featuring both domestic and international components-is the state on
which UNMIK was modeled.
154. Seeid
155. Id. at 535-36.
156. See id
157. Slaughter, supra note 32, at 183-86.
158. See Slaughter, supra note 30, at 534-37.
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4. The Real New World Order(1997)'59
Before 1997, Slaughter kept the world of liberal states and the world
of nonliberal states sharply divided. In her article in Foreign Affairs that
mostly served as a popularization of her ideas, this distinction crumbled.
Rather than contrasting her ideas with her old foes-IR Realists and
Institutionalists-Slaughter began The Real New World Order by
contrasting her ideas about disaggregated sovereignty with those of the
"new medievalists," who believed, in short, that nongovernmental
institutions, like NGOs and multinational corporations, were taking
political power out of the hands of territorial states.6° These scholars,
Slaughter argued, failed to understand that governments remained a locus
of power as a result of their regulatory strength, democratic
accountability, and control over the legitimate use of violence.'6 ' She also
contrasted her ideas with those of idealistic liberal internationalists, who
wanted massive, global governing institutions.'62 Instead of thinking
about globalism as a stateless arena, with governing needs taken care of
by either supranational institutions or international private actors, a
network made up of the disaggregated parts of national states could
provide the policy-making needed in a rapidly globalizing world.'63
Much of the argument followed the lines of her previous pieces,
with one notable exception. Slaughter now argued that issue networks
made up of disaggregated parts of states could help achieve U.S.
President Clinton's avowed goal of "enlargement" of the number of
democratic liberal states.' She argued that government networks
spanned across the liberal and nonliberal divide and could be used to
increase the capacity of nonliberal states, one institution at a time.'
"Transgovernmental ties can strengthen institutions [in nondemocratic
states] in ways that will help them resist political domination, corruption,
and incompetence and build democratic institutions in their countries,
step by step."'6
159. Slaughter, supra note 32, at 183.
160. Id. at 183-84.
161. Id. at 184-85.
162. Id.
163. Id at 185 ("Transgovernmentalism also offers promising new mechanisms for the
Clinton administration's 'enlargement' policy, aiming to expand the community of liberal
democracies.").
164. Id.
165. Id. at 194.
166. Id.
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Although Slaughter did not note it, this argument was a dramatic
step away from her previous work. Legitimate, liberal states were
assumed to exist in previous papers and nondemocratic, nonliberal states
were assumed away. Here, she made a bold, new claim: the framework
that served to regulate behavior between liberal states could be used to
create them.'67 Unlike the rest of her work, which drew heavily from IR
scholars, this claim seems to be ex nihilo.'68 Moreover, nothing in the
article, or elsewhere in her work, responded to common claims made by
IR scholars that democratization and modernization often work at cross
purposes. This claim served, though, an enormous purpose in the overall
structure of the article. The previous pieces served to create a model of
regulation among a coterie of liberal states; with the inclusion of this
claim, Slaughter's theory could be said to be a "real new world order"
complete with a battle plan for how to transform the world as it stood
into the world of her models.
Slaughter also moved her theory forward on two other grounds.
The first was in the domestic political realm. She argued that both
conservatives and domestic liberals could agree on disaggregated
sovereignty because it achieved the ends of regulating international
economic behavior, but avoided huge international bureaucracies.'69
"Transgovernmental initiatives are a compromise that could command
bipartisan support.""'7 Also, democratic accountability was not a major
problem, she claimed, because the policy-making by substate actors
internationally is formally the same as them making it domestically."'
Legislatures and private actors have come up with ways to regulate and
monitor the behavior of the administrative arms of the welfare state and
should be able to do the same thing with a disaggregated international
regulatory regime.'72
With political support from both major parties and a model for
creating liberal states, Slaughter's model was relatively complete. The
model, originally an extension of Kantian themes to solve a difficult
167. Id. at 196-97.
168. It does, however, bear a close family relationship to the work of the World Society
scholars. However, they focus on the role of ideas and international institutions and their
interplay with state officials, rather than just on substate governmental interactions. The claims of
the World Society scholars, in this regard, bear a closer relationship to Koh's idea of compliance
than they do to Slaughter's work.
169. Slaughter, supa note 32, at 192-93.
170. Id. at 193.
171. Id.at 195-97.
172. Id at 197.
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riddle on an arcane legal matter, had transformed itself into a model built
for the exigencies of the world as it existed at the end of the century.
"[G]ovemment networks are government for the information age. They
offer the world a blueprint for the international architecture of the 21st
Century."'73 While later pieces fleshed out this model, especially relating
to the typology of different types of transgovernmental issue networks,'74
The Real New World Orderpresented what was a fully formed theory of
how the world operated and what states looked like in 1997.'
As noted above, this theory gained great prominence in the realm of
international law and on the world stage. As this Article argues below,
the image of the state that this theory created served as a model for the
creation of UNMIK. In the service of analytic simplicity, it is necessary
to distill exactly what traits "the State" has in this model. In addition to
the traits of the autarkic liberal state discussed in The Act of State
Doctrine, modem states in the liberal model have these five traits:' 6
(1) Disaggregation: This is the most central concept in Slaughter's
work. She argues that the modem liberal state, both in the ways it
behaves at home and in the creation of foreign policy, is not unitary but
made up of formally and legally distinct bodies. The separation of
powers between these bodies is, to her, the central idea of "new
sovereignty" and fudging the lines between them or creating strict
hierarchies of power between them is the cardinal violation of the
sovereignty of the states.
(2) Apoliticism: The modem state is apolitical in two important
senses. The first is that the basic tenets of her new state-
disaggregation, the importance of "low politics," and "the
internationalization of decision-making"-are supported by a broad
mass of political actors (both among liberal states and within them, as
her invocation of the potential for support from both Republicans and
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J.
191 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies,
andDisaggregatedDemocracy, 4 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003); Slaughter, supm note 81, at 347;
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Building Global Democmcy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223 (2000); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000).
175. Her new book, A New World Order, lays out effectively the same model, untouched
by the events of the beginning of the twenty-first century. She is so wedded to this understanding
that she chooses not to discuss the attacks of September 11 th, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, or
the primacy of international terrorism as political issues, even to argue that they have not affected
the ways in which countries in the world relate to one another. See SLAUGHTER, supm note 82.
176. The following list summarizes Slaughter's liberal state model, discussed supra Part
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Democrats for her ideas makes clear). Secondly, it is broadly
technocratic in that most decisions are not made by traditional
democratic means, that is, as the result of majoritarian elections. Instead
they are made through negotiations between appointed or elected
officials across state lines.
(3) Internationalism: traditional notions of sovereignty are not
compatible with the modern, liberal state. Because problems are
international, solutions and decision-making must be as well. As such,
international norms play an important role in even domestic decision-
making, even if only as a model for potential choices.
(4) Presumptive legitimacy: The modern liberal state is
democratic and seen as legitimate within its own borders. It is therefore
relatively unconcerned with the problems of democratic accountability,
as the existing institutions of democracy can provide oversight for
otherwise nondemocratically accountable decision-makers.
(5) Capable of recreation through institution-by-institution links:
liberal states can recreate themselves by crafting institution-by-institution
links. Nonliberal states can be transformed through the interaction of
their disaggregated parts with the parts of liberal states. Institution-by-
institution, then, a modern, liberal state can be created.
IV UNMIK AS A LIBERAL STATE
The formation of UNMIK represented a broad change in the way
the United Nations viewed its responsibilities and powers in relation to
nongovemed areas.' It also represented an enormous shift in how
international and national bodies understood the proper way to create a
new state. The decisions made by the United States, other international
organizations, and relevant nation-states about how to structure UNMIK
were fundamentally influenced by the inherent understanding of what a
liberal state is within the disaggregated sovereignty literature. This, of
course, does not mean that the literature caused or even directly
influenced the decisions made by the key players in the process of setting
up UNMIK. Instead, the claim is that the conceptions of what comprises
a state that were rife in World Society expressed themselves both in
scholarly literature and in policy-making. That the U.S. decisions and the
academic community had some effect on one another seems rather likely,
177. See Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 76, 78 (2001) (noting that "the Kosovo conflict presented a radically different
situation from" previous U.N. interventions).
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but those causative strings are better left to biographers and historians.
Instead, this Part will focus on the broad correlation between the image
of state in the scholarly literature and the structure of UNMIK. It can be
said, however, that the scholarship was not reactive to the decisions of the
United Nations. The formation of the disaggregated sovereignty model
in its most complete form predated the war in, and the reconstruction of,
Kosovo. The central argument of this Article is that these ideas-
whether expressed in scholarly publications or held in the minds of
influential policy-makers-had consequences.
A. How UNMIK Came To Be.- Kosovo, NATO, and the United
Nations
Kosovo had been a rather autonomous region for significant periods
of its history, but in 1999 it did not have any real governing institutions of
its own. '78 The NATO bombing campaign began in March 1999 and,
during the conflict, eight prominent foreign ministers established:
[A] set of general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis,
which included, among other things, an immediate and verifiable end to
violence and repression in Kosovo; withdrawal from Kosovo of Serb
military, police, and paramilitary forces; and the deployment in Kosovo of
effective international civil and security presences.
179
These principles were eventually accepted by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia as part of the deal ending the war.
When the Yugoslav military withdrew, the situation in Kosovo was
dire:
Out of a total population of about 1.7 million, 800,000 Kosovars had fled
or been driven out of the province and as many as 500,000 others had been
internally displaced; most of these refugees followed NATO troops back
into Kosovo, but many found their homes and possessions destroyed or
stolen. At the same time, economic activity in much of the province had
come to a halt as a result of Serb repression, war damage, the collapse of
financial services and investment, and the departure of key personnel. Serb
officials and technical personnel had largely abandoned Kosovo and the
FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] had ceased funding municipal
governments, causing schools, public transport, the courts, and other vital
178. See Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolving the Conflict over
Kosovo' Final Status, 31 DENy. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 387, 396 (2003) ("From 1989, the Kosovar
Albanians were denied the ability to exercise any sovereign authority or functions or even to
participate in the federal government.").
179. See Matheson, supa note 177, at 78 (quotations omitted).
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services essentially to shut down. Relations between the Albanian and
Serb residents of Kosovo were in serious disrepair, punctuated by
widespread reprisals, looting, and seizures of homes and other property,
with no functioning law enforcement system to provide justice."'
Although the United Nations had engaged in a variety of other projects
that Ralph Wilde describes as International Territorial Administration, "a
formally constituted, locally based management structure operating with
respect to a particular territorial unit," it had never administered a
country.
18'
Following a proposal laid out at a G-8 summit, the United Nations
began to do just that by passing Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999.82 It
authorized member states, and particularly NATO, to establish an
international security force with a unified command and control
apparatus to establish secure conditions and assist the return of displaced
persons.' Further, the Secretary-General was empowered:
[T]o establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide
an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo
can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions.'
84
The Secretary-General formally established UNMIK and appointed a
special representative to come up with a plan for how the new
"government" should be run and how it should relate to the Kosovo
Force (KFOR), that is, the body of mostly NATO troops stationed in
Kosovo.
85
180. Id (citations omitted); see also Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 48.
181. Wilde, supranote 1, at 585.
Because of the plenary administrative powers seemingly asserted in the Kosovo and
East Timor projects, and the involvement of the United Nations, the two projects are
often regarded as groundbreaking. An extreme view holds that the East Timor
undertaking is unprecedented, since nowhere else has UN administration been used to
bring a new state into existence. No doubt, these projects are unusual and in some
respects unique.
Id at 585-86.
182. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
183. Seeid. cl. 7.
184. Id. cl. 10.
185. See Security Council Authorizes UiN Presence in Kosovo War Ends After 78 Days of
Bombing, U.N. CHRON., June 22, 1999, at 12.
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This plan had to be developed quickly, given the pressing needs of
the citizenry of Kosovo for a government of some sort, and had to be
done without the benefit of much historical precedent.'86 Even if the
United Nations had run a large number of quasi-governing projects like
refugee camps and cities, it had, with one short exception in the early
1960s, never administered an entire territory.'87 The novelty of the
problem and the required speed of the answer are crucial to the key
theoretical step of this Article.
As noted above, legal scholars have long relied on the assumption
that judicial opinions can reveal underlying assumptions even when they
do not rely on these assumptions as the basis of their holdings.'88 Since
there was no apparatus to deal with these types of "governing
problem[s,] '"'9 and because the lack of time to make such a decision
precluded a wide-ranging public debate on the subject, the actual
decision about how to structure UNMIK provides the only evidence of
what the relevant decision-makers thought about when creating a state.
Because these decision-makers included, at the very least, the Security
Council, NATO (because NATO troops became the basis of KFOR), the
European Union and OSCE, of which both have a formal role in the
administration of UNMIK, we can say that this decision was made by the
developed world as a whole and parts of the less-developed world as
well.'9 If the assumption legal scholars make about judicial opinions
applies equally well to questions of international institutional design,
then it is possible to use the decision about how to structure UNMIK as a
means to analyze the dominant image of the state in World Society in
1999.
If one is willing to take this leap, then it is possible to examine what
that governing image looked like. The next Part of this Article will argue
that this image was the disaggregated notion of state popularized by the
liberal IRIL scholars discussed above.
186. See Jacob S. Kreilkamp, UN Postconflict Resolution, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
619, 644 n.126 (2003) ("[O]nly two days before the Resolution was passed, there was still no
consensus on whether the United Nations or some other organization should take the lead in
running Kosovo's civil administration.").
187. The exception is the seven months the United Nations administered West Irian in
1962-63. SeeWilde, supra note 1, at 588.
188. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
189. SeeWilde, supranote 1, at 605.
190. See generally The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Interim Administation Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 (July 12, 1999)
[hereinafter July 12 Repor4.
TULANE J OFINT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 14:179
B. UNMIK and the Liberal State.- A Point-by-Point Comparison
In Part III of this Article, five crucial characteristics of a liberal state
were identified. The last of these-the ability of the liberal state to
recreate itself in nonliberal areas by institutional links-is of a different
type; it is broadly about how a state comes into being rather than what
the state looks like when it does. As such, it will be discussed separately
in Part V For the thesis of this Article to hold, the other four must be
accurate descriptions of the institutional set-up of UNMIK. Looking at
each of them in turn will show that they are.
1. The Disaggregated State: UNMIK's Impossible Flow Chart
Power inside UNMIK is nothing if not disaggregated. The general
structure of UNMIK was laid out in Resolution 1244 and two reports
from the Special Representative to the Security Council for Kosovo, on
June 12 and July 12, 1999.9 ' The plan presents a highly decentralized
government, with final power resting in the UN special representative,
but day-to-day operation of a variety of crucial tasks in the hands of a
number of different organizations.'92  "The Mission will rely on the
capabilities and expertise of the various international organizations that
will participate, while maintaining coherence and effectiveness."'93 As
one scholar noted, "The structure [the Special Representative] created for
UNMIK reflected the heavy dependence of the operation on the efforts
and resources of various states and international organizations.'"" The
issues of how authority would work, how policy would be made when
different organizations collided, and how these organizations would
interrelate was left to informal negotiations among the relevant policy-
makers.
The initial plan for UNMIK consisted of four "pillars."'9 5 Pillar I
related to humanitarian assistance and was led by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.'96 This office was
supposed "to ensure that adequate shelter, food, clean water, medical
191. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 182; The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolugon 1244 (1999), U.N. Doc.
S/1999/672 (June 12, 1999) [hereinafter June 12 Report.
192. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 182; June 12 Repor4 supranote 191; July 12ReporF
supra note 190.
193. June 12 Repor supra note 191, 2.
194. Matheson, supra note 177, at 79.
195. UNMIK, UNMIK at a Glance, http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (last visited
Jan. 18, 2006).
196. June 12Repor4 supranote 191, 5(b).
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assistance and employment will be available to meet the needs of the
growing number of returnees inside Kosovo itself," by providing
assistance through its own auspices and by coordinating the work of a
variety of U.N. agencies and independent humanitarian groups.'97 These
agencies and groups included the World Food Programme (WFP), the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC), the International Office of Migration (IOM), the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) within the Secretary
General's office, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
Kosovo's Red Cross and a large number of NGOs98 The United Nations
directly ran Pillar II, which involved the general civil administration of
Kosovo, including health policy and judicial affairs.' 9  The United
Nations also shared responsibility for policing with KFOR, which
continued to be stationed in Kosovo, and local Kosovo police service,
which it was supposed to train.2" OSCE was responsible for Pillar III,
which dealt with democratization and institution building, including
responsibility for developing political parties, holding elections,
organizing the development of the media and ensuring compliance with
human rights norms."' Redevelopment of the heavily damaged local
economy was put in the hands of the European Union (Pillar IV), which
would coordinate development aid, help reconstruct the local
infrastructure, and construct a functioning, market-based economy."
The Special Representative to the Secretary General was in charge
of coordinating the activities of these different pillars, with the head of
each pillar (appointed by the lead organization) serving as a Deputy
Special Representative."3 "The deputy special representatives will report
directly to the Special Representative and will also be responsible for
ensuring the effective coordination of all activities, both of UNMIK and
its partners, within their areas of designated responsibility."' These
Deputy Special Representatives would also play a role in a variety of
committees, including the Executive Committee and the Joint Planning
Group, each of which were designed to negotiate and coordinate policy
between the pillars. Exactly how they would adjudicate these disputes,
197. July 12 Report, supra note 190, 92.
198. Id. M 91-100.
199. Id. 54-59, 66-78.
200. Id. 160-65.
201. Id. 80-90.
202. /d. I 101-109.
203. Seeid. 46; June 12Repo, supra note 191, 4.
204. July 12 Report, supra note 190, 46.
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though, was left unclear."5 "The UNMIK model of several pillars, under
different multilateral organisations' leadership, brings a proliferation of
competing agendas and interests from both multilateral and national
participants....
Power and reporting relationships among the Pillars and between
the Pillars and the Special Representative were left to negotiation rather
than fit into strict lines of authority. Similarly, inside the Pillars, the two
reports envisioned that the lead organization would be just that: an
organization entrusted both with playing a part and coordinating the
activities of other organizations in their area of responsibility.27 For
instance, Pillar IV was supposed to coordinate between all potential
donors (i.e., all interested states), representatives of the Kosovar
community, the U.N. Development Programme, other interested U.N.
agencies, and international financial institutions. 8 In addition, the
European Union (which is, itself, of course, hardly a unified body)
divided responsibility internally among the EU Pillar, the European
Commission Task Force for the Reconstruction of Kosovo, and the
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office. °9 On top of this, each
of the other Pillars had important economic portfolios: Pillar I was in
charge of "economic and budget affairs," governmental regulations, and
the areas of telecommunications, health, and property rights; Pillar II was
in charge of certain sectors of the economy, especially electronic and
print media; Pillar HI was in charge of humanitarian assistance and
providing employment opportunities. 10 These overlaps were confused
even more by the fact that the organizations that worked with one Pillar
also worked with others. For instance, USAID, the US foreign aid office,
played a crucial, often commanding, role in both the provision of
205. Id. IM 47-48.
206. Tony Preston-Stanley, Doubts over a UN Role in Post- War Iraq; Alter Kosovo, the
United Nations Has Severe Limitations for Building Institutions and Offenng Governance,
CANBERRA TIMEs (Austl.), Apr. 29, 2003, at 11.
207. See June 12 Repor4 supra note 191, IM 2-14.
208. Julyl2Report supranote 190, 101-102, 109.
209. See European Union Pillar of UNMIK, European Union Mission in Kosovo,
http://www.euinkosovo.org/pdefault.asp?id=78&Lang-2 (last visited Jan. 12, 2006); see also
European Agency for Reconstruction, Kosovo, http://www.ear.eu.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm (last
visited Jan. 12, 2006).
210. June 12 ReporZ supm note 191, 8-14; July 12 Repot supra note 190, 14-16,
59-78, 80-90, 99-100.
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humanitarian assistance under Pillar III and the development of Kosovo
under Pillar IV21'
A full detailing of the organizations involved in each area can be
found in the document itself and on the various websites run by
UNMIK. 2' For the purposes of this Article, an organizational flow-chart
is unnecessary. Instead, it should just be noted that (1) power was
diffused to a number of different organizations termed "Pillars"; (2) the
Special Representative was formally in charge of all UNMIK operations,
but most day-to-day decisions were conducted within these Pillars;
(3) within each issue area, a whole variety of organizations, substate
governmental officials and other interested parties coordinated to make
policy without formal chains of responsibility; (4) conflicts between
organizations, both inside the Pillars and between them, were supposed
to be negotiated by both formal and informal means without a clear
decision mechanism aside from the potential of executive action.2 '
On top of this structure was the creation of KFOR, the nominally
U.N.-controlled military operation consisting mostly of NATO troops that
ran all quasi-government functions in Kosovo for the first six months
after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army (because UNMIK had not yet
entered into Kosovo)."' Resolution 1244 made clear that UNMIK would
"coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that
both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually
supportive manner. '  KFOR was supposed to "establish and maintain a
secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order; to
monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the
agreements that ended the conflict; and to provide assistance to the UN
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 2" 6 KFOR troops have also been at the
forefront of providing humanitarian assistance."7 While NATO is
211. See Preston-Stanley, supra note 206, at 12 ("The current SRSG, Michael Steiner,
recently described CFA [Central Fiscal Authority] as one of the most successful institution-
building components of UNMIK. The CFA was part of the EU pillar although most international
staff came almost entirely under a contract funded by the US government, through USAID, from
September 1999."); U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., Kosovo TRANSITION INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/fs991110_4.html.
212. See generally July 12Repor4 supra note 190.
213. A simple Web search for "UNMIK" supplies countless examples. See, e.g., UNMIK
Home Page, www.unmikonline.org. SeegenerallyJuly 12 Report, supra note 190, 14-7.
214. See July 12Report supra note 190, 4-7.
215. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 182, cl. 6.
216. Kosovo Force, About KFOR, http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/about.htm (last visited
Jan. 18, 2006) [hereinafter AboutKFOR].
217. Kosovo Force, Background to the ConflicA http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/intro.htm
(last visited Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Background to the Conilicd.
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responsible for the command of KFOR, a total of thirty countries,
including non-NATO members, have contributed troops."8 Exactly how
KFOR and UNMIK were to relate to one another was left to negotiation.
According to the June 12 report, "effective arrangements will be
established for regular consultations between the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General and the Commander of the international
security presence.29
On top of the mixed competencies of KFOR and UNMIK and the
relationships among the constituent organizations of UNMIK, the
development of local governance added to the web of decision-making.
The Special Representative was given all legislative power in Kosovo, but
there was a complicated relationship with both the nascent efforts by
UNMIK to create local self-governance structures and with budding
efforts by Kosovars at governing themselves.220  Exactly what
competencies were to be given to Kosovars themselves, and how that
power would conflict with or eventually usurp the power of the Special
Representative, was left relatively unclear. Prior to the arrival of
UNMIK, Hashim Thagi, leader of the Kosovar Liberation Army, took
control of political and administrative power in twenty-seven of the
twenty-nine municipalities.2 ' UNMIK formally sidelined this
government, but local UNMIK officers "had little guidance" about how
to share power with Thagi's local officials.2 Several months after the
entry of UNMIK into Kosovo, the Irish Times described local
governance in this way: "In truth there are.., competing sources of state
authority in Kosovo today, none with more than one of the prerequisites
of successful statehood, authority, legitimacy, or executive power."2 3
Others have been less critical of the set-up, noting the difficulty of such
an unprecedented grant of responsibility to an international organization,
and have argued that the system of mixed competencies was the best
response to an unsure and underfunded operation.22' But no one disagrees
218. See About KFOR supm note 216; Background to the Conflic4 supra note 217.
219. June 12 Repor4 supm note 191, 7.
220. See July 12 Repor supra note 190, 35, 44.
221. See INT'L CRISIS GRoup, WArrING FOR UNMIK: LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN Kosovo
(1999), available at http://www.crisisweb.org/library/documents/reportarchive/A400012_
18101999.pdf [hereinafter WAITING FOR UNMIK].
222. See id
223. Patrick Smith, In Kosovo Everything from Teachers to Power Workers Must Be
Provided IRISH TIMES, Nov. 9, 1999, at 14.
224. Williams, supra note 178, at 410-11 ("While the local municipal political structures
were slow to implement legislation and were often charged with petty corruption, the overall
consensus among international observers is the municipal governments are functioning as basic
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with the proposition that power was extremely diffused in Kosovo and
that government power was disaggregated among various players, each
of which had complicated and unclear relationships with one another.
The structure of UNMIK, then, was a response to the situation that
was presented to the United Nations, but it was not the only possible
response. Though different in many aspects, Allied control of Germany
and U.S. military control of Japan both shared the basic problem faced by
UNMIK-the withdrawal or collapse of government after a successful
military campaign. Those operations were structured very differently,
along a model that can roughly be described as a military protectorate,
with clear formal lines of authority and clear lines of command.225 The
U.S.-run government in Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein also
did not have the complicated, multiorganizational power-sharing system
of UNMIK. This organizational structure was a choice and it was a
choice informed by the underlying belief in the international community
at the time about what a state is and how it can be created.
2. The Apolitical State: Technocrats and the Choice of Law
Another crucial part of the liberal model of the modem state is that
most decisions are apolitical. Relying on substate actors to make policy
internationally, as the model suggests they do, raises questions about
democratic control and separation of powers within a state. The
response-or rather, the lack of a response-relies on a worldview that
reasonable governmental officials can work together to solve problems in
ways that are roughly "right." Anne-Marie Slaughter describes the
Memorandum of Understanding, the most common means of agreement
between regulatory agencies in different states as "good-faith
agreements, affirming ties between regulatory agencies based on their
like-minded commitment to getting results."226 In this conception,
"getting results" is a neutral concept, based on the facts. This gives
politics, or contested ideas about what good results are, a backseat,
leaving those disputes as either unimportant because everyone agrees or
as something that can be worked out in informal negotiations or by
skilled work by talented bureaucrats.
political entities and are capable of assuming increasing degrees of authority and are likely to play
a constructive role in protecting human rights and promoting a normalization of life in Kosovo.").
225. See RAY SALVATORE JENNINGS, THE ROAD AHEAD: LESSONS IN NATION BUILDING
FROM JAPAN, GERMANY, AND AFGHANISTAN FOR POSTWAR IRAQ 13-18 (2003).
226. Slaughter, supra note 32, at 190.
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Perhaps the biggest test faced by UNMIK in the early stages of its
governance of Kosovo was the determination of what law would govern
the territory. The decision (or rather, decisions, as the Special
Representative changed the policy a number of times) bears the hallmark
of this type of apolitical ideal.
Resolution 1244 directly dealt with the question of the law that
would govern Kosovo.227 Specifically, it declared that the law, criminal
and civil, that governed Kosovo immediately before the NATO bombing
campaign would continue to govern mutatis mutandis except as far as the
laws conflicted with regulations passed by UNMIK" 8 This meant
Yugoslav or, in the opinion of the Albanian Kosovars, Serbian law.
Administrability and ease of transition counseled for such a choice.
"This decision was made solely for practical reasons: first, to avoid a
legal vacuum in the initial phase of the transitional administration and,
second, to avoid the need for local lawyers, virtually all of whom had
obtained their law degrees at domestic universities, to be introduced to an
entirely foreign legal system.
' '2 29
The very first regulation passed by UNMIK placed another
condition on the maintenance ofYugoslav law. It stated:
[L]aws applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999 shall
continue to apply in Kosovo insofar as they do not conflict with ...
internationally recognized human rights standards and shall not
discriminate against any person on any ground such as sex, race, color,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social
origin, association with a national community, property, birth or other
status.
230
The decision to use Yugoslav law was deeply unpopular with the
Albanian majority in Kosovo, particularly the criminal laws, which were
seen as part of a decade-old system of legal oppression and
discrimination aimed at ethnic Albanians.23 ' Despite the addition of the
227. SeeS.C.Res. 1244, supranote 182, cl. 11.
228. See id.
229. Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 58.
230. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, On the Authority ofthe Interim
Administration in Kosovo, §§ 2-3, UNMIK/REG/1999/1, July 25, 1999 [hereinafter Report of the
Special Representative].
231. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the Rule of
Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275,2291-92 (2003).
The problem was that to Kosovo's one and one-half million ethnic Albanians, the
applicable laws in Kosovo before the bombing campaign began were "Serb laws" a key
symbol of Serbian oppression against the Albanians. While the concept of "honor"
may have little salience in modem America, in Kosovo it remains of great cultural
220
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condition that laws that discriminate or violate human rights would not
apply, Albanian politicians in Kosovo threatened to stop cooperating with
UNMIK, and a number of judges and prosecutors quit in protest.232 They
demanded that Kosovo be governed by a set of laws that existed ten years
earlier, when Kosovo was a relatively independent province within then-
communist Yugoslavia. " This criminal code, not surprisingly, was
problematic in its own right, both unpopular with the Serbian minority
and inconsistent with modem notions of the rule of law.3
The decision to use Yugoslav law subject to the condition that
human rights norms would limit its bad effects relied heavily on the
ability of international and newly appointed judges to get the right
results. Regulation 1999/1
importance. After ten years of Serb oppression, an ethnic cleansing campaign, an
armed struggle, and, perhaps, a narrowly averted genocide, the idea that the UN would
issue a decree requiring the Kosovar Albanians to continue to live under Serb law was
profoundly insulting to many Kosovars. To the bureaucrats at UNMIK, the fact that the
pre-1999 laws had been promulgated by Serbs seemed purely academic, but to many
Kosovars, it was an offense to honor of the deepest sort.
It made no difference that UNMIK Regulation Number 1 said that human-rights
standards would trump the laws on the books in the event of a conflict. To the
Kosovars, Serb law was Serb law, and they wanted none of it. Nearly all of the fifty-
five people sworn in by UNMIK to serve as judges and prosecutors in UNMIK's new
"Emergency Judicial System" immediately declared that they would not apply Serb
law.
Id.
232. Wendy S. Betts et al., The Post-Conflict Transitonal Admiistration of Kosovo and
the Lessons Learned in Efforts To Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L.
371, 374-75 (2001).
In August 1999, the provisional Kosovar Albanian judges, appointed by UNIvK,
began to protest openly against the presumed application of FRY/Serbian law. Among
these judges, the SRSG's selection of applicable law was considered tantamount to re-
establishment of the prior, oppressive FRY/Serbia regime. The resistance to
FRY/Serbian law resulted in confusion in the legal system. The interim judges, the
Kosovo Implementation Force (KFOR), and the UNMIK Civilian Police each applied a
diverse collection of legal provisions and standards, including FRY/Serbian law, pre-
1989 criminal law, and Albanian criminal law, to alleged perpetrators of crimes.
Consequently, many trials were delayed and the alleged perpetrators of crimes
remained in detention for extended amounts of time.
Id.
233. See Brooks, supra note 231, at 2292-93.
234. Id. at 2293.
Ironically, the pre-1989 laws, so dear to the Kosovar Albanian community, were far less
consistent with modem international human-rights standards than the post-1989 Serb
law they had so vehemently rejected. The pre-1989 laws were designed in the
Communist era, before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the advent of greater openness in
Yugoslavia.
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did not actually spell out the laws or specifically identify the elements that
were inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights standards.
Rather, it required the lawyers, many of whom were inexperienced, to
engage in the complex task of interpreting the penal code or the criminal
procedure code through the lens of international human rights instruments,
applying those provisions that met international standards, while
disregarding those that did not, and substituting for the latter the
appropriate standard under international law.235
This is consistent with the assumed apolitical nature of regulatory
decisions in the liberal model of the modem state.
The difficult decision about the content of laws was put aside, as it
was believed that regulators, lawyers, and judges could informally
develop fair standards and keep the peace without such overtly political
and contentious decisions such as what law should govern. Moreover,
doing so avoided what was perhaps the most ominous ideological
problem for UNMIK: looking like colonists. Rather than imposing a
new law from on high, UNMIK decided to use the products of local
decision-making, ignoring the fact that such local decision-making is
exactly what led to the war in Kosovo.236
UNMIK later revised its decision in Resolution 24, declaring that
the law would be the law in force in 1989 (the old Kosovar law).2' This
led to problems as well. Not many people knew the old law, and much of
it was not available in translation.238 Moreover, the goal of consistency
and administrability was hindered by such a massive change in the law at
a time when many trials were in process and judges and lawyers were
coming to terms with the first choice of law.2" These problems have led
many commentators to call for an internationally created legal
framework that can be imported into U.N.-administered territories
immediately.2 4 Whatever the merits of such a policy, it clearly was not
what the founders of UNMIK had in mind. Instead, the choice about
Id.
235. Strohmeyer, supm note 6, at 59.
236. See Report ofthe SpecialRepresentative, supm note 230, § 3.
237. See The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, On the Law Applicable in
Kosovo, § 1.1, UNMIK/Reg/1999/24, Dec. 12, 1999 ("The law applicable in Kosovo shall be:
(a)(a) The regulations promulgated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and
subsidiary instruments issued thereunder; and (b)(b) The law in force in Kosovo on 22 March
1989.").
238. See Bets et al., supra note 232, at 376 & n.17.
239. See id
240. See, e.g., Strohmeyer, supra note 6, at 66.
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what law would govern derived from the liberal model of state that
animated the structure of UNMIK.
3. The Legitimate State: Assuming Away the Problem of Sovereignty
As noted above, the fullest explanation of the IR/IL project in the
legal scholarship is Slaughter's International Law in a World of Liberal
States, which explains how international law would function if the world
consisted exclusively of liberal states. Most of the paper focuses on one
aspect of her thought experiment: that all states in her imaginary world
are liberal. However, just as important to her theory is the idea that it can
safely be assumed that all states are states, that is, sovereign over their
territory and able to control their populace through a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force. The liberal states in Slaughter's thought
experiment are unconcerned with worries about revolts of the citizenry
and are generally accepting of their territorial bounds. To the extent they
are not, problems can be solved by internal negotiations (i.e., elections)
or international ones (either state-to-state or by resorting to an
internationally recognized arbitrator).24' The way UNMIK dealt with two
crucial problems, the final legal status of the territory and how to involve
local politicians in the decision-making apparatus, shows that it generally
accepted the idea that issues like sovereignty and state legitimacy,
traditionally the core of both international law and international territorial
administration, were less important than creating a governance structure
and could be solved by negotiation or some other means.
Looming over the entirety of the decision to create UNMIK was the
problem of the final status of the province. The negotiated settlement to
end the war did not make Kosovo independent but left it part of
Yugoslavia (now Serbia and Montenegro). 42 However, Kosovo was to
"enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia." ' 3 The meaning of this phrase was left unclear, as was the
question of how to resolve this ambiguity.2"
Instead of focusing on the question of who was sovereign over
Kosovo, the United Nations' focus was to create the institutional
apparatus of governance. Resolution 1244 laid out the "main
responsibilities" of UNMIK, including "[p]erforming basic civilian
administrative functions where and as long as required ... [o]rganizing
241. See generally Slaughter, supra note 30.
242. See Kreilkamp, supra note 186, at 644.
243. Id
244. Seeid at644&n.128.
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... elections... [and m]aintaining civil law and order," along with other
functions that, taken as a whole, gave the United Nations authority to run
the territory."5 The establishment of government services was supposed
to predate any solution to the major political questions. Kosovars were
supposed to run Kosovo, according to the Resolution, once the
governance apparatus was established, but the final question of who
controlled the territory was left unanswered, "pending a political
settlement.""24  The belief was that, once there were structures of
government, Kosovo, Albania (which a large number of Kosovar's
wanted to join), and Serbia could negotiate a political settlement. 47
Rather than government being a function or decision made by a
sovereign, or the organization running the protectorate, sovereignty is, in
this model, a product of governance. Once there were officials and a
working civil service, the emotional issues of sovereignty would seem
less important and could be resolved through negotiations.48
That this was even considered an option shows how deeply the
liberal state model influenced UNMIK. Traditionally, questions of
sovereignty were supreme in international law-the whole "Westphalian
system" is predicated on the supremacy of sovereigns over their
territory."' Sovereigns made all political decisions and international law
dealt with questions surrounding the relations between sovereigns."
In Kosovo, the United Nations decided not to decide on a process
for resolving the sovereignty question or a timeline for giving up power.
The idea that de facto governance matters more than de jure sovereignty,
with all its attendant questions about nationalism, is a deeply liberal
one."' The European Union, after all, is the model for the liberal model
245. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 182, cl. 11.
246. Id. cl. 11 (c).
247. Id.
248. Palmer, supm note 5, at 182 n.12.
However, the member states involved in UNMIK have different conceptions of the
character and goals of the mission. While some advocate independence for the
province, others support continued Yugoslav sovereignty over the province. This
fundamental lack of consensus has caused great complications as the United Nations
has sought to create a workable administration for the province.
1d,
249. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 283, 283-84 (2004).
250. Id. at 284.
251. Slaughter, supra note 30, at 535.
If the State is disaggregated as a positive matter, can sovereignty continue to attach to a
unitary State as a normative principle designed to constitute that State as a unitary
entity?
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and its focus on de-emphasizing national solutions in favor of regional
ones was predicated on an assumption that effective regional governance
and the prosperity it would produce would overcome national hostilities.
UNMIK made a similar assumption, namely that Kosovars would care
more about having running water than they would about which country
retained ultimate sovereignty over the territory.252 This can be stated
differently: UNMIK worked on the presumption that if it was effective it
would be legitimate.
The approach Resolution 1244 took toward self-governing
institutions shows a similar assumption of legitimacy. Specifically, it did
not take any stance toward them whatsoever. According to a 1999 report
by the International Crisis Group, Resolution 1244 "is vague about the
timing and purpose of elections. 25  When local UNMIK officials
arrived, they were greeted by a government on the ground-the
provisional forces of the KLA, led by Thagi.25 ' The plan for UNvMK was
unclear about how international officials should treat these local leaders
(who were also accused of committing atrocities). The flexibility of the
governing networks of officials was supposed to take local
considerations into account, but exactly how was left to them.255 UNMIK
ignored claims that the legitimacy of its operation rested on its ability to
incorporate or displace domestic political groups and, instead, focused on
A world of liberal States could be conceptualized as a transnational polity. The
organizing principle of this polity would mirror the organizing principle of liberal
States: the limitation of State power by establishing multiple institutions designed both
to overlap and complement one another. The resulting system of "checks and
balances"-competition and coordination, division and duplication-creates sufficient
friction to curb the abuse of power. The result, to borrow a term coined by political
theorist Daniel Deudney, is a "negarchy," a liberal political order between anarchy and
hierarchy in which power is checked horizontally rather than vertically. These divisions
and deliberately created frictions are further designed to create space for individuals
and groups to interact with and influence State institutions, rather than being passive
subjects of their rule.
Id
252. Although this is not important for the general question of the Article, the role of ideas
in the creation of the structure of UNMIK, it should be noted that this assumption is still disputed.
U.N. Secretary-General "Annan's reports continue to strike a positive tone, focusing on the
mission's successes. Nonetheless, the consistent problems that stem, in part, from the uncertain
fimal status of the province still permeate even these official narratives." Kreilkamp, supra note
186, at 651.
253. INT'L CRISIS GROUP, STARTING FROM SCRATCH IN Kosovo: THE HONEYMOON IS OVER
9 (1999), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report-archive/A400022-
10121999.pdf.
254. SeeWAITINGFORUNMIK, supa note 221, at 3-5.
255. Id.
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solving specific problems involving local participation in different
ways."' Such an approach privileged "results" over questions of
legitimacy. Given the liberal model, this makes sense; in a world of
liberal States, the basic functions of statehood are assumed and do not
have to be created.
4. The Internationally Defined State: Foreign Norms and Local Facts
That policy decisions can and should be a result of international
substate actor negotiations is crucial to Slaughter's liberal model. To
some extent, it would be impossible for that not to happen in Kosovo--
an international operation had to govern the territory. However,
Slaughter's model included more than just an international web of
decision-makers playing a role in the policy choices of each and every
country; it also argued that international norms and examples play a large
and increasing role in the political life of liberal states.' 7 Discussing the
ways in which national courts borrow from each other despite the lack of
binding precedential authority of foreign decisions, Slaughter noted
"courts would interact with one another and with supranational tribunals
in ways that would accommodate differences but acknowledge and
reinforce common values. ' 8
Very little research has been done on the role of foreign norms in
policy-making in Kosovo. One study, though, reveals that foreign values
were crucial to policy decisions and that the structure of UNMIK
facilitated these "value transfers," even when the policy in question may
not have been particularly well-suited for such importation.59
This study, done by Laura Palmer, examined the way UNMIK, and
specifically Pillar III, led by OSCE, created hate speech laws.2" As part
of its pillar, OSCE developed a Department of Media Affairs, which was
given responsibility for regulating and supporting independent media and
for developing a media standard, as well as power over frequencies and
broadcast licenses in Kosovo. 6' OCSE would oversee the Media
256. Id. at 4-5.
257. See, e.g., Slaughter, supr note 32, at 189.
258. Id.
259. See Palmer, supra note 5, at 185-86.
260. See id
261. See id.; see also Steven Erlanger, NATO Peacekeepers Plan a System of Controls for
the News Media in Kosovo, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at A8; Stacey Sullivan, Restructuring the
Media in Post-Conflict Societies. Four Perspectives: The Experience of Intergovernmental and
Non-Governmental Organizations A Background Paper for the Unesco World Press Day
226
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Regulatory Commission, which would administer codes of conduct for
journalists, and a Media Monitoring Division, which would analyze the
content of broadcasting."' This was seen as a way to limit ethnically
based hate speech and incitements to violence through the media.
Broadly speaking, this is in line with European hate speech rules.
Moreover, it directly and intentionally followed the ways in which the
Allies regulated the press in post-war Germany."3 Palmer surveyed both
European and U.S. court decisions and academic debate and found that a
broad division existed. U.S. courts and academics favored less regulation
and generally followed a "libertarian model" while Europeans support
more governmental restrictions on free speech.2"
OSCE responded to this debate with little consideration of
conditions on the ground in Kosovo. The American media and
international media watchdog groups responded to OSCE's press
oversight with derision, claiming that the way to respond to hate speech
was to counter it with other speech and not to muzzle it. 5 In response to
this criticism, OSCE largely removed its press oversight rules, replacing
them with a system of press self-regulation.26 After the passage of the
new (and largely unimplemented rules), a Kosovar Albanian newspaper
declared that a Serbian working for UNMIK was a former paramilitary
for the Yugoslav government."' Two weeks later, the official disappeared
and was later found dead.6 8 In response to this, OSCE reintroduced press
regulations along European lines. 9 Palmer argued that transitional
states, especially those riven with ethnic and political violence, require
heavier oversight of speech than the mature American democracy does.7'
Whether Palmer is correct is unimportant here. What is relevant is
that the debate inside OSCE largely followed the lines of the debate
among its member-states, the United States and European countries." '
Thus, it is important to see that even though the ultimate decision relied
on factual bases, international norms were accepted reasons for making
Conference in Geneva, 2 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFL. RESOL. 1, 26-40 (Monroe E. Price ed.,
2001).
262. See Palmer, supra note 5, at 186.
263. Seeid at201.
264. Seeid at 196, 201, 205.
265. See id. at 186.
266. Seeid at 194.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id. at 195-96.
270. Seeidat213.
271. Seeid. at 185-86, 194-96.
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policy in Kosovo. While Realist scholars would expect states to make
policy independently based on their interests, the liberal model expects
and encourages foreign ideas about good policy to serve as examples for
policy-making. OSCE's vacillations on hate speech regulation show that
UNMIK internalized this idea.
5. Conclusion: The Fifth Trait
The structure of UNMIK represented the full acceptance by the
international community (or at least the relevant decision-makers) of the
idea of the state inherent in liberal international law. The question
remains, though: why did these decision-makers decide that this model
of state was one that could be used to build a government in Kosovo?
The next Part of the Article attempts to answer this question by focusing
on the fifth trait of the liberal state in the Liberal literature-its ability to
recreate itself through substate governmental institution-to-institution
links.
V CONCLUSION: UNMIK, THE WORLD SOCIETY LITERATURE, AND
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STRUCTURE OF IDEAS
The World Society literature has the potential for revolutionizing the
study of international relations and international law because of its focus
on solving problems that other major theories have not sought to
examine. "We are trying to account for a world whose societies,
organized as nation-states, are structurally similar in many unexpected
dimensions and change in unexpectedly similar ways."'72 The empirical
work done by World Society scholars has shown that, despite facing very
different problems and housing citizenries with different opinions and
tastes, nation-states look a great deal like one another in their
administrative structure and policy choices. Their forceful explanation
relies on sociological explanations-for example, the ways in which the
leaders of states connect to one another, or the pressures on states to copy
successful policies in other states.273 However, this does not capture the
entirety of the reasons why certain ideas spread more quickly and
powerfully among some states than others. Through a comparison of the
findings of this Article and the work of Antony Anghie on the League of
Nations trustee system and its ideological underpinnings,"4 it is clear that
272. Meyer et al., supra note 16, at 145.
273. See id at 145-46.
274. See generallyAnghie, supra note 35.
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the internal structure of ideas matters in determining whether ideas will
be transferred abroad as well as the transmission mechanisms and
pressures laid out in the World Society literature.
In order to understand why the structure of ideas remains important,
even in this heavily sociological model, it is necessary to lay out the
World Society model in full. The model is based on a whole range of
empirical findings and then explanations drawn from contemporary
sociological institutionalism.2" The model is best explained through an
example used in a leading article:
If an unknown society were "discovered" on a previously unknown
island, it is clear that many changes would occur. A government would
soon form, looking something like a modem state with many of the usual
ministries and agencies. Official recognition by other states and admission
to the United Nations would ensue. The society would be analyzed as an
economy, with standard types of data, organizations, and policies for
domestic and international transactions. Its people would be formally
recognized as citizens with many familiar rights, while certain categories of
citizens-children, the elderly, the poor-would be granted special
protection. Standard forms of discrimination, especially ethnic and gender
based, would be discovered and decried.... Modem educational, medical,
scientific and family law institutions would be developed. All this would
happen more rapidly, and with greater penetration to the level of daily life
... than at any earlier time because world models applicable to the island
society are more highly codified and publicized than ever before.
Moreover, world-society organizations devoted to educating and advising
the islanders about the models' importance and utility are more numerous
276
and active than ever.
This prediction-which World Society scholars argue can be made
without any reference to the "history, culture, practices or traditions" of
the hypothetical island-is based on an enormous empirical project. 7
This project has tracked the diffusion of changes in the
administrative form of the modem state and state policy decisions across
countries and across time. "The central problem is how best to
understand the state as an organizational actor-including the form,
structure, and practices of states."'78 The findings are striking. Across
very different areas of the world and over time, states exhibit a great deal
of "isomorphism,' that is, they resemble each other to an extreme degree,
275. SeeMeyer et al., supra note 16, at 147, 151.
276. Id. at 145-46.
277. Id.
278. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 16, at 1757.
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and when changes happen in policy, state policies across states vary
together.79
This phenomenon cannot be explained just as the effect of Western
imperialism, because rich countries are as statistically likely to adopt
policies and institutions that began in poor countries as vice versa.2" Nor
can it be explained by the fact that states have similar responsibilities:
countries all over the world facing very different problems end up
structuring themselves in the same way. In the language of sociology, the
isomorphism is "decoupled" from the tasks at hand. "[S]tructural
similarity does not reflect converging task demands, or, put differently,
structure is not determined by function.' 28' The degree of replication and
its lack of connection to democratic results or state needs or interests can
produce shocking (and often comic) results. Landlocked nations
structure their armed forces in the same way as islands, leaving their
militaries with navies without water, and countries without any scientific
establishment to speak of have science policy review boards to issue
ethics reports and give guidance to non-existent scientists.8 2 States
implement record-keeping in similar ways, insert similar anti-
discrimination and child protection clauses into their constitutions,
engage in compulsory mass education with very similar curriculums, and
create similar organizational structures, with ministries for the same
basic topics common across nations.2 3  Even for more basic matters,
isomorphism reigns:
279. Id at 1758.
280. "First, although one would assume that poorer countries are more susceptible to such
external coercion, the empirical studies discussed above show that norm adoption does not
correlate with the economic wealth or development of countries." Ryan Goodman & Derek
Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and Intemational Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J.
621, 652 (2004).
281. Goodman & Jinks, supm note 16, at 1759.
282. 1d. at 1766-67.
283. Though supra notes 23-30 gave a quick sample of the issues in which states have been
found to feature isomorphism, the list is much longer. A 1997 article listed the following:
[C]onstitutional forms emphasizing both state power and individual rights, mass
schooling systems organized around a fairly standard curriculum, rationalized
economic and demographic record keeping and date systems, antinatalist population
control policies intended to enhance national development, formally equalized female
status and rights, expanded human rights in general, expansive environmental policies,
development-oriented economic policy, universalistic welfare systems, standard
definitions of disease and health care, and even some basic demographic variables.
Meyer et al., supra note 16, at 152-53 (citations omitted). See generally David John Frank et al.,
What Counts as History A Cross-National and Longitudinal Study of University Curricula, 44
COMP. EDUC. REv. 29 (2000); John W Meyer, The Changing Cultural Content of World Society,
in STATTECutLTuR: STATE FORMATION ArTER THE CULTURAL TURN (George Steinmetz ed., 1999).
230
2005] INTERNATIONAL LAW THEOR YAND KOSOVO 231
Nation states are remarkably uniform in defining their goals as the
enhancement of collective progress (roughly gross domestic product
[GDP] per capita) and individual rights and development (roughly citizen
enhancement and equality). This occurs in constitutions ... in general
statement on national education ... in depictions of the nation ... in
educational curricula... and in vast amounts of formal economic policy.
8
Moreover, when changes occur, they happen across countries or, put
mathematically, as this research almost always is, policy changes across
nations feature a high degree of covariance.285
While states are, of course, different from one another, and a
number of variants of the common state model exist, the sheer mass of
the World Society research project makes clear that there is some force
that causes states facing very different problems, embedded in very
different cultures and having very different political systems to organize
themselves in common ways and to pursue common policies.
The World Society scholars argue that states look like one another
because they all partake of the same larger world culture.286 That is, states
do not exist as independent variables with fixed and independent
interests, but rather are defined by the relation to other states and world
society and have interests that are created in world culture. The
scholarship therefore focuses "on processes that produce or reconstruct
the actors themselves.
' 287
There are three major processes by which World Society defines
and fashions states in this model. The first is the "construction of
identity and purpose" of states.8 World Society gets to decide what
political body is a state through the process of recognition by other states
and by admissions decisions to the United Nations and other
international organizationsY.2 9 This requires copying the general forms of
statehood, as it is defined internationally, and the renunciation of certain
potential goals (most notably territorial expansion)." This has a
dramatic effect on policy. "Having committed themselves to the identity
of the rationalizing state, appropriate policies follow-policies for
national development, individual citizenship and rights, environmental
284. Meyer et al., supra note 16, at 153 (citations omitted).
285. See id at 152, 157.
286. Id. at 157.
287. See id
288. Id.
289. Seeid at 158.
290. See id.
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management, foreign relations."29 ' Moreover, this is an ongoing process.
One can see WTO accession agreements in which well-established states
like China must adapt their laws to incorporate generally accepted
market practices as an example of this "construction of identity.292
The second process is the "systematic maintenance of nation-state
actor identity."'93 Aid (and a lack of sanctions) from international
organizations and other states flows to states that embrace internationally
common goals and that accept internationally defined policies.'M
Finally, World Society scholars point to the "legitimation of
subnational actors and practices" as another means by which policies and
practices defined in world culture create state identity.'95 Individuals or
groups inside states interact with their counterparts internationally; they
create common answers to problems and then push states to enact
them. "6 "Such connections produce many axes of mobilization for the
implementation of world-cultural principles and help account for
similarities in mobilization agendas and strategies in highly disparate
countries."'
9 7
This model creates a set of falsifiable predictions. Using tools
ranging from regression analysis to the study of history, scholars can test
whether the fact that a policy has been implemented in some countries
makes it more likely that other countries will adopt it. As Ryan
Goodman and Derek Jinks, the leading World Society scholars in legal
academe, point out:
[O]ur approach is falsifiable in that it generates a range of concrete
empirical predictions that allow for the adjudication between our approach
and competing explanations.... The important point is that our approach
avoids circularity problems by clearly differentiating, as an analytic matter,
explanatory (institutions) and outcome variables (organizations).9
Moreover, it is different than the liberal discussion of international state
policy-making, which focuses on relations between state institutions,
rather than on the structural pressures on states as a whole and the ways
individuals relating internationally create pressures on states to engage in
isomorphism. Two questions remain, though: (1) what explains which
291. Id. at 159.
292. Id. at 158.
293. Id at 159.
294. Id. at 159-60.
295. Id. at 160.
296. Seeid at 161.
297. Id.
298. Goodman & Jinks, supm note 16, at 1781-82.
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ideas diffuse and (2) what explains those instances when ideas do not
diffuse.
In a recent paper, Goodman and Jinks focused on the second of
these questions, exploring the ways in which different placement in the
world system and different institutional design could lead to the quicker
adaptation of human rights norms.299 Looking at variables like the
conditions for joining organizations, the conditionality of aid and
connections between leaders and substate actors to international society,
they argue that human rights can best be protected in countries that do
not protect them now through a process of inclusive membership in
international organizations, which would lead to the acculturation of
rogue states."° This connects with much of the scholarship in other areas
of the research project that focus on the extent of contacts and the role of
institutions in creating these contacts as the dominant force in creating
isomorphism."'
This Article looked at the other side of the question; it focused on
what types of ideas travel inside World Society and how they travel. It
argued that within the structure of ideas, there are certain features that
make them more or less likely to be transmitted through the process of
world cultural change. Specifically, it argued that something about the
disaggregated sovereignty model-the idea that institution-by-institution
links could create a liberal state out of a nonliberal one-enabled it to
become the theoretical underpinning for the structure of UNMIK.
Without this claim, the model could be described as contingent, or reliant
for its relevance on certain conditions. It argued that preexisting liberal
states behaved in certain ways without expressing any belief about the
ways in which nonliberal states (or nonstates) behaved."2 With it, it
became noncontingent, or universally applicable, claiming that any
governed areas could become a liberal state through a process of substate
government actors relating to one another."'
299. SeegeneralyGoodman & Jinks, supm note 280.
300. Seeid. at 628-29.
301. See, e.g., David John Frank et al., Environmentalism as a Global Institution: Reply to
Butte], 65 AM. Soc. REv. 122, 122 (2000).
302. Seeid. at 122-26.
303. The concept of dividing ideas between contingent and noncontingent ideas has many
similarities with Noah Feldman's description of ideas as mobile or nonmobile (in his parlance,
Islam and democracy are both mobile ideas). See NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JUIAD 31-50 (2003).
However, Feldman's terminology is not clear-or at least nor clear enough-about what makes
certain ideas mobile and others nonmobile for it to be useful for this Article.
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Within the World Society model, it is easy to skip the step of
discussing whether ideas that exist in world culture are considered to be
universally applicable by the constituent parts of world culture. This is
because most of the ideas studied by World Society scholars are not
contingent-for example, Goodman and Jinks study human rights, which
is, by definition, a universal concept-and because the World Society
model is itself a universal model attempting to explain how all states in
the world behave.
Not all ideas are similarly universal or noncontingent in states of the
world. In his study of the League of Nations' Mandate System, Antony
Anghie argued that previous attempts by an international organization
were marked by a contingent conception of a state. " Specifically, he
claimed that the sovereignty of non-European nations that arose out of
the Mandate System and the period of decolonialization had a radically
different character than European sovereignty precisely because
sovereignty, and hence the state as it existed in the minds of the relevant
actors in world culture, was defined as European:
My argument, developed through an examination of the Mandate System,
is that sovereignty did not extend without problem to the non-European
world. Rather, sovereignty acquired a different form and character as it
was transferred from the European to the non-European world. Non-
European sovereignty is unique, and this article attempts to explore the
character of this uniqueness and how it came into being. My further
argument is that the history of non-European sovereignty cannot be
separated from the larger history of sovereignty itself. Traditionally,
international law asserts that there is one juridical version of sovereignty,
implicitly European sovereignty, which applies to all states. This
understanding is crucial to the maintenance of the fundamental premise of
international law: that all states formally are sovereign and equal. My
argument, by contrast, is that international law and institutions created two
different models of sovereignty: European sovereignty and non-European
sovereignty."5
That is, a fully sovereign state in the minds of the League of Nations and
other important players, according to Anghie, could only be European.
Anghie argued that the sovereignty of former trusteeships in a non-
European context was qualitatively different than the sovereignty enjoyed
by European states."'
304. SeeAnghie, supm note 35, at 520.
305. Id.
306. See id
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The difference, then, was in the idea itself. After World War I,
according to Anghie, European culture had an idea of statehood that it
did not think could be transferred to former colonies and other trustees.
In 1999, world culture, as expressed through the decisions of the United
Nations in structuring UNMJK, had an idea of state that it did think
could be transferred and that it thought could be transferred in specific
ways."7 While the way the League of Nations ran its Mandate System
and the way the United Nations ran UNMIK were different, the
difference in result cannot be explained exclusively by examining
changes in the means of transmission. The level of willingness to
transmit the ideas in their full form was different because the ideas
themselves were different.
The World Society literature, with its heavy focus on sociological
explanation, does not make room for this type of effect. Moreover, the
possibility of contingent and noncontingent ideas raises many normative
questions. While in the context of state-building we may be suspicious
of contingent colonial-style ideas, other contingent ideas may make more
sense. Decoupling of the sort discussed above can have negative effects
for people in a large number of ways. After all, there is no particular
reason why a landlocked state should have a navy or why states without
many scientists should have science policy review boards. While
Goodman and Jinks focus on engaging in institutional design to create
more isomorphism when it comes to protecting human rights, there may
be instances where we want to engage in institutional design to create
less isomorphism in other contexts, either to avoid costly results like
landlocked navies, or to privilege experimentalism.
Moreover, understanding the effect of the structure of ideas should
put pressure on those members of world culture who create ideas. If it is
understood (in fact, assumed) that ideas will transfer beyond their
original context and reason for existing; solutions to specific problems in
one country inevitably have externalities that are felt in other countries.
Those that create and adopt ideas-ranging from scholars to officials in
international organizations-ought to consider whether these are positive
or negative externalities and if anything can be done to limit (or
exacerbate) the effect of these externalities by changing the ideas
themselves.
307. Anghie rejected that the idea of sovereignty had changed particularly and argued that
modem development theory was a direct outgrowth of the Mandate System. Id. at 522. I clearly
disagree.
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The United Nations Mission in Kosovo is an extraordinary
experiment in creating a state out of an ungoverned area. Its
extraordinariness provides us with an opportunity to look at the state of
our ideas, not only about nation-building, but about international law and
policy-making generally. The onus lies on those that create ideas to fully
understand its lessons.
